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Abstract 
There is an ongoing discussion regarding the circumstances under which individuals 
seek to maximize the welfare of the common good rather than their own benefit – two motives 
that are contrasted in social dilemmas. In this context, it could be shown that cooperation 
behavior in social dilemmas decreases with decision time and, thus, represents a spontaneously 
expressed phenomenon. This finding has triggered substantial debate about the cognitive 
underpinnings of prosocial behavior in the fields of psychology and behavioral economics to 
which this thesis contributes with the scope of two articles: First, dispositional pro-sociality 
(i.e., social value orientation and Honesty-Humility) was identified as a moderator of 
spontaneous cooperation. Specifically, spontaneous cooperation was shown to be valid only for 
prosocial individuals – thus offering an explanation for heterogeneous replication results of the 
spontaneous cooperation effect. In turn, the second article explores whether spontaneous 
cooperation can be generalized to costly punishment behavior (also known as instrumental 
cooperation) in social dilemmas. Specifically, negative affect and social value orientation are 
investigated as potentially underlying motives of spontaneous punishment. Results show that 
spontaneous punishment – unlike spontaneous cooperation – is not conducted by prosocials but 
rather retributively displayed by highly upset, above-average contributors. These results of the 
similar, spontaneously expressed behavior in social dilemmas and the accompanied motivations 
are critically discussed concerning their added value to the underlying theory of spontaneous 
cooperation as well as in light of a theory of spontaneous pro-sociality in general. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Ob die Natur des Menschen ausmacht, intuitiv nach dem eigenen Nutzen zu streben oder 
diesen – als erste und spontane Reaktion – dem Gemeinwohl unterzuordnen, ist Bestandteil 
einer andauernden, interdisziplinär-wissenschaftlichen Debatte. Die Veröffentlichung des 
„spontanen Kooperationseffekts“ im Jahr 2012 von Rand, Greene und Nowak hat in der 
Psychologie wie Verhaltensökonomie eine Vielzahl an Replikations- und Folgestudien 
angestoßen. Die vorliegende Arbeit ist Bestandteil dieser Debatte und trägt dazu bei, die 
heterogene Befundlage verschiedenster Replikationsversuche zu erklären und die 
Generalisierbarkeit spontaner Kooperation zu testen: Es wird gezeigt, dass spontane 
Kooperation den Entscheidungsdefault für Individuen mit einer prosozialen Persönlichkeit 
repräsentiert. Weiterführend wird die Allgemeingültigkeit spontaner Prosozialität untersucht 
und geprüft, ob Bestrafungsverhalten in sozialen Dilemmata als so genannte instrumentelle 
Kooperation ebenfalls ein spontanes Phänomen darstellt und analog zu spontaner Kooperation 
demselben Verlauf über die Entscheidungszeit folgt. In diesem Kontext wurden auch die 
zugrundeliegenden Motive als moderierende Faktoren untersucht und gegen jene kontrastiert, 
die spontaner Kooperation unterliegen. Hierbei zeigt sich, dass spontanes Bestrafungsverhalten 
im Unterschied zu spontaner Kooperation kein Akt von dispositional-prosozialen Individuen 
ist. Vielmehr ist spontane Bestrafung retributiver Natur und wird von den Personen ausgeführt, 
die überdurchschnittlich viel zum öffentlichen Gut beigetragen haben. Zusammenfassend 
werden die Ergebnisse spontan- elementaren wie instrumentellen Kooperationsverhaltens 
kritisch im Licht einer spontanen Prosozialitätstheorie diskutiert.  
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1. Introduction 
The discussion of human nature, whether prosocial motives dominate over egocentricity, is 
ongoing in many disciplines such as philosophy, biology, psychology, and economics (e.g., 
Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994; Dawes & Thaler, 1988; Dawkins, 1976; Rand & 
Nowak, 2013; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). Cooperation behavior in social dilemmas poses 
a form of prosocial behavior, as individual and (societal) group interests are conflicting in this 
context. This thesis sheds light on the underlying decision processes of cooperation behavior 
by considering the self-paced decision time for (un-)cooperative behavior. Specifically, it 
investigates for whom cooperation represents a spontaneously emerging phenomenon that is 
reflected in shorter decision times than defective (i.e., un-cooperative) behavior. Second, it 
examines to which extent spontaneous cooperation generalizes to costly punishment behavior 
in social dilemmas. This is accomplished by investigating whether punishment similarly poses 
a spontaneously expressed phenomenon that is dependent on dispositional pro-sociality or 
whether the underlying motives differ from those of spontaneous cooperation. 
In recent years, interdisciplinary research has started to focus on the cognitive processes 
that underlie prosocial behavior (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2010; S. Fiedler, Glöckner, Nicklisch, & 
Dickert, 2013; Fischbacher, Hertwig, & Bruhin, 2013). Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012) 
propose a fundamentally positive evaluation of human nature – in that humans behave 
intuitively prosocial – by showing a “spontaneous cooperation effect”. This effect is 
characterized by a negative correlation between decision times in single-play (“one-shot”) 
social dilemmas and cooperation behavior. Furthermore, putting participants under time 
pressure yields significantly higher cooperation rates in comparison to a time delay 
manipulation. This not only indicates the causality of reduced decision time leading to higher 
cooperation behavior but also implies potential intervention opportunities, in that pro-sociality 
can be promoted even more strongly by inducing an intuitive processing mode.  
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These findings fundamentally contradict economic rational choice theory (e.g., Becker, 
1976; Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, & Wilson, 1982), which predicts a striving for individual gain 
maximization in general irrespective of processing mode. Obviously, Rand et al. (2012) were 
not the first to foil the image of the homo oeconomicus. Models of social preferences have 
acknowledged the utility that some individuals gain when considering other persons’ welfare 
(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Van Lange, 
1999). In addition, Rand et al. (2014) propose the “Social Heuristics Hypothesis” (SHH), which 
seeks to explain from an evolutionary perspective how cooperation has proven to be 
advantageous in daily-life and is adapted as the behavioral default even in one-shot laboratory 
interactions.  
A scientific debate about the spontaneous cooperation effect started shortly after the 
principal publication and is still ongoing (e.g., Kvarven et al., 2019; Montealegre & Jimenez-
Leal, 2019). In addition to the heterogeneous results of several replication studies (e.g., 
Bouwmeester et al., 2017; Camerer et al., 2018; Tinghög et al., 2013), which opened the 
discussion of its replicability, moderators were identified to better understand the conditional – 
situational as well as dispositional – factors that underlie spontaneous cooperation (e.g., 
Kieslich & Hilbig, 2014; Rand et al., 2012; Santa, Exadaktylos, & Soto-Faraco, 2018). The two 
articles in this thesis contribute to this debate by answering the following questions:  
a) Is spontaneous cooperation replicable as a main effect? 
b) Does a person-situation interaction explain the heterogeneity of replication results in 
that spontaneous cooperation is conditional on dispositional pro-sociality? 
c) Does spontaneous cooperation generalize to costly punishment behavior in social 
dilemmas? If so, how comparable are the underlying motives?  
In addition to linking and discussing the two articles of this thesis, this synopsis provides 
two overarching contributions to the literature: First, it focuses on the underlying theory of 
spontaneous cooperation, namely the SHH (Rand et al., 2014), and evaluates its empirical 
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content (Popper, 1934/2005). Specifically, it is outlined how the empirical content increases 
when using the results of the articles of this thesis to modify the SHH. Second, the decision 
conflict hypothesis (A. M. Evans, Dillon, & Rand, 2015; Krajbich, Bartling, Hare, & Fehr, 
2015) is investigated in this synopsis in greater detail – which stems from recent debates in 
which the authors argue that measured (vs. manipulated) decision time cannot be used to infer 
an intuitive vs. deliberate processing mode. Rather, decision time was shown to represent the 
degree of decision conflict (A. M. Evans et al., 2015) or the (lacking) strength of preferences 
towards one of the choice options (Krajbich et al., 2015). Therefore, this synopsis provides 
additional analyses whether the data of the two articles support the entanglement of decision 
conflict and intuitive processing in addition to discussing their relation on theoretical grounds. 
Outlining the structure of this thesis, I will first sketch the theoretical background behind 
the spontaneous cooperation effect. To do so, I will first introduce cooperation and punishment 
behavior in social dilemmas before linking them to social value orientation as a measure of 
dispositional pro-sociality. Then, I will direct the focus towards the cognitive processes that 
potentially underlie (non-)cooperative behavior and describe how they have shown to be 
reflected in decision time duration. Specifically, I will consider arguments from the debate 
mentioned above and distinguish between measured and manipulated decision time. 
Delineating the research question of the first paper, the spontaneous cooperation effect and its 
underlying theory, the SHH, are presented, followed by an overview of the replication attempts 
and identification of moderators of the spontaneous cooperation effect.  
Discussing the first paper subsequently concerning its limitations and impact requires one 
to analyze whether decision conflict can similarly account for spontaneously expressed 
behavior (of prosocials) as could an intuitive processing mode. The results of additionally 
conducted analyses are subsequently discussed concerning their implications for the current 
work. Transitioning to the second paper, the question will be addressed regarding how 
generalizable the spontaneous cooperation effect is, as the SHH as the underlying theory of the 
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spontaneous cooperation effect is mute concerning its applicability beyond cooperation 
behavior. In this context, I will analyze the empirical content of the SHH to assess its general 
scientific quality, as this allows one to outline the contribution of both articles in this thesis on 
theoretical grounds. This synopsis concludes by critically discussing the results of the second 
paper before turning to the implications this thesis has for a modified theory of spontaneous 
pro-sociality.
 
1.1 Cooperation as the rational choice 
 
“Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish.”   
         (Dawkins, 1976, p. 215) 
Cooperation behavior in social dilemmas is a necessary prerequisite for a sustainable 
society (Hardin, 1968). Environmental protection to minimize climate change represents such 
a social dilemma, exemplifying one of the currently most complex societal challenges 
(Cramton, MacKay, Ockenfels, & Stoft, 2017; Milinski, Sommerfeld, Krambeck, Reed, & 
Marotzke, 2008). Here, the dilemma structure and its societal implications are particularly 
obvious: It is individually costly to engage in environmental protection (e.g., by recycling waste 
or using public transportation rather than going by car). Therefore, one might rely on the eco-
sensitive behavior of other individuals to achieve the goal of reduced carbon dioxide emission. 
However, when too many people free-ride and refrain from contributing to environmental 
protection, global warming is inevitable and (negatively) affects free-riders and contributors to 
the same extent. In more general terms, Dawes (1980) characterized social dilemmas by two 
features: First, there is a temptation to not cooperate, as defection individually yields a higher 
outcome than cooperation, independent of other individuals’ behavior. Second, and creating the 
dilemma structure, if all societal members defect (i.e., no one contributes to the public good), 
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the individual’s outcome is lower than if all individuals cooperated (for reviews on social 
dilemmas, see Kollock, 1998; Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & van Dijk, 2013).1 
Economic games allow researchers to model the complex structure of real-life social 
dilemmas in a simplified way and investigate the determinants of cooperation behavior in 
laboratory settings while assuring internal validity (Camerer, 2003). The prisoner’s dilemma 
(Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; Tucker, 1983) and its extension to multiple players as the public 
goods game (Head, 1974; Ledyard, 1995; Marwell & Ames, 1979) are two of the most common 
social dilemma games. In a public goods game, the relevant social dilemma for this thesis, 
participants face the conflict between either keeping a monetary endowment (i.e., choosing to 
defect) or contributing (parts of) it to a common pool (i.e., choosing to cooperate) at the risk of 
being exploited should the others defect. The degree of conflict is mirrored in the marginal per 
capita return (MPCR), reflecting the relative earning that the individual receives from the public 
good for every contributed monetary unit (see Isaac, Walker, & Thomas, 1984). Higher MPCR 
factors reflect increasing returns from the public good. As soon as the return of the public good 
is larger than the individual contribution (i.e., an MPCR greater than one), the dilemma situation 
is dissolved, as cooperation becomes individually beneficial.2 
Turning to the question of whether people should cooperate from a game theoretical 
perspective – setting individual payoff maximization as the ultimate goal – defection is the 
dominant strategy for finite interactions, independent of the other actors’ behavior (Selten, 
1978). This holds not only for one-shot but also for a finite number of multiple interactions 
                                                 
1 In this context, it is useful to distinguish between social dilemmas, namely social traps (also known as take some 
dilemmas or the tragedy of the commons, see Hardin, 1968) and social fences, also known as give some dilemmas 
(Van Lange et al., 2013). The collective risk of climate change consists of a social trap, where it is individually 
beneficial to exploit currently existing resources to a maximum degree at the risk of creating unforeseeable damage 
for future generations (Milinski et al., 2008). In turn, in social fences, or give some dilemmas, the resource needs 
to be built in the first place (e.g., dikes that protect a population from being flooded) before it can provide its 
benefits. This thesis uses paradigms of the latter dilemma type, where individuals can choose whether to contribute 
to a resource and potentially benefit in case of its multiplication. 
2 In turn, a social dilemma is present when the individual only gets a fragment of its contribution in return from 
the public good (i.e., an MPCR smaller than one). Therefore, a cooperative individual is at risk of being 
exploited as she is dependent on the contribution behavior of the societal group members in order not to lose 
originally possessed resources. 
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(Pettit & Sugden, 1989). In this vein, predictions of economic rational choice theory paint a 
very bleak picture of human cooperativeness in that decisions are only made in line with an 
individualistic, self-maximizing tendency (Becker, 1976; Kreps et al., 1982) where cooperation 
occurs only when it benefits the actor (Hechter, 1987) or when there is a risk of detection and 
punishment (Becker, 1968). The prototype of a rational actor is typically described as the homo 
oeconomicus. Characterizations of the homo oeconomicus are extensive and sketch his rational 
and egocentric nature as a “player [who] is not indifferent to any possible profit, however small” 
(Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944, p. 228). This perspective on human nature leaves little 
space for pro-social behavior – be it helping behavior (e.g., donations) or cooperation behavior 
in social dilemmas.  
Fortunately, the majority of people do not behave as rational choice theory suggests. 
Research investigating when and why human decision making deviates from the rational choice 
prediction postulated by classical economic theory is summarized under the framework of 
behavioral economics (for an overview of the historical development, see Camerer & 
Loewenstein, 2011). Individuals consider the outcome and welfare of others and refrain from 
maximizing their own payoffs. For instance, people share almost a third of their resources, on 
average, in dictator games (for a meta-analysis, see Engel, 2011) and they even cooperate in 
one-shot public good games without any prospect of reciprocity (e.g., Andreoni, 1988; 
Yamagishi, Terai, Kiyonari, Mifune, & Kanazawa, 2007).  
In addition, individuals not only cooperate but also punish norm-violators at their own 
cost. Punishment enables individuals to restore equality in outcomes by withdrawing resources 
at the cost of investing (a portion of) their own resources. Important for the generalization from 
spontaneous cooperation to spontaneous punishment addressed in this thesis, such punishment 
similarly represents a form of cooperation behavior as it shares the same characteristic of being 
costly for the individual yet beneficial for the group. Punishment behavior is therefore referred 
to as a second-order public good (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Yamagishi, 1986) as “[e]verybody in 
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the group will be better off if free riding is deterred, but nobody has an incentive to punish the 
free riders” (p. 137). In a similar vein, Yamagishi (1986, 1988) distinguishes between 
elementary cooperation where individuals contribute to provide the public good and 
instrumental cooperation (i.e., punishment behavior). The latter term points out that punishment 
is an effective tool to make defection unattractive in the first place, as the cost of being punished 
easily exceeds the benefits of defection (Yamagishi, 1986). Corroborating the functionality of 
punishment, it was robustly shown that punishment is suited for and used to maintain 
cooperation in repeated interactions (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Camerer & Fehr, 2006; Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fehr & Rockenbach, 2004; Oliver, 1980). Without 
the threat of being punished, cooperation diminishes over repeated interactions (Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002). 
Similar to cooperation behavior, however, the rational choice is not to invest any 
resources to punish others. Stated differently, the homo oeconomicus would never punish, much 
as he would not cooperate in the first place. However, the behavior that individuals actually 
display once again contradicts the rational choice prediction, similar to the case of cooperation 
behavior. Punishment has even been observed in one-shot interactions (e.g., Henrich et al., 
2006), where punishment is purely retributive and cannot serve (direct) deterrence purposes.  
Taken together, there are two stages in which individuals can cooperate, that is 
contribute to a public good. The first order public good (i.e., elementary cooperation) consists 
of the contribution behavior to maintain the public good (or, in the case of a take-some dilemma, 
refrain from exploiting the resource). As a second order public good, norm violators can be 
punished to restore equality and deter from future free-riding (i.e., instrumental cooperation; 
Yamagishi, 1986). Contrary to rational choice theory, people engage in both behaviors. One 
explanation for the discrepancies between normative predictions and the descriptive level of 
cooperation behavior can be located in the spectrum of social preferences (e.g., social value 
orientation; Van Lange, 1999) as presented in the following. 
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Social value orientation 
Models of social preferences capture stable individual differences in inequality aversion 
(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) or, more 
generally, the consideration of the outcome and welfare of others (Van Lange, 1999). Social 
value orientation (SVO) is one prominent concept within the framework of social preferences 
taking into account the notion “that individuals tend to pursue broader goals than self-interest” 
(Van Lange, 1999, p. 337). Importantly, SVO still allows one to capture the weighting function 
of a perfectly self-interested (i.e., individualistic) actor and thus does not contradict but rather 
expands the rational choice prediction (Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011). Specifically, 
SVO mirrors the weight one allocates to outcomes of oneself vs. others (Balliet, Parks, & 
Joireman, 2009) when distributing (monetary) resources in a series of decomposed games in 
which an individual allocates a fixed sum of money between herself and a recipient (Murphy 
& Ackermann, 2014). As an example, consider the item of the SVO Slider Measure (Murphy 
et al., 2011) depicted in Figure 1: Allocating resources between oneself (upper row) and an 
anonymous other person (lower row) implies weighting one’s own against the other person’s 
outcome in absolute terms as well as in terms of the difference between outcomes (i.e., degree 
of inequality). Formally, the weighing of one’s own versus another person’s outcome can be 
expressed in a utility function where U = w1 × (own payoff) + w2 × (others’ payoff) (Liebrand 
& McClintock, 1988). Different specifications of this function exist – for instance, by adding a 
w3 component that represents the motivation to achieve equality in outcomes (Van Lange, 
1999).3  
                                                 
3 The herein used operationalization of SVO with the SVO Slider Measure (Murphy & Ackermann, 2014; 
Murphy et al., 2011) calculates within the primary six items solely the weight to the own (w1) and the other 
person’s outcome (w2). Inequality aversion (w3) is seen as a prosocial preference (Murphy et al., 2011; Van 
Lange, 1999) and contrasted against the maximization of joint gains as a different prosocial motivation in nine 
secondary items of the Slider Measure (Ackermann & Murphy, 2012).  
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Figure 1. Exemplary item of the SVO Slider Measure (Murphy et al., 2011). Participants 
allocate monetary resources between themselves (upper row) and an anonymous other person 
(lower row).  
 
The allocation choices allow for the classification of an individual as one of four SVO 
types (Liebrand & McClintock, 1988). Figure 2 shows the different categories and 
corresponding monetary allocations (Murphy et al., 2011): Individualists (i.e., proselfs) only 
give weight to their own outcome (w1 = 1, w2 = 0), which is reflected in a corresponding choice 
of the first option (100 monetary units (MU) for oneself vs. 50 MU for the other person, see 
also Figure 1 as the corresponding item). Altruists, in contrast, only focus on maximizing the 
other’s outcome at the cost of minimizing their own (w1 = 0, w2 = 1). In between those two 
extremes are the prosocials, who give equal weight to both outcomes (w1 = 1 and w2 = 1) – for 
instance, by choosing a fair split of 85 MU for both decision makers (see Figure 2). Notably, 
also competitors consider the other person’s outcome, though with a diametrically different aim 
to maximize inequality to one’s benefit (w1 = 1, w2 = -1). This implies that competitors refrain 
from maximizing their own payoff for the sake of putting the other person relatively worse off, 
as for instance reflected in a choice of 85 MU vs. 15 MU instead of equally distributing 85 MU 
(see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Graphical representation of social value orientation (SVO). Categorizing a person to 
one of the four categories of social values stems from her weighing her own payoff (w1, 
displayed on the x-axis) against another person’s outcome (w2, displayed on the y-axis). The 
solid lines reflect the six primary items of the SVO Slider Measure contrasting the different 
types against each other. Figure 1 represents the line from an individualistic value orientation 
(100 MU for oneself vs. 50 MU for the other) to a prosocial value orientation (each gets 85 
MU).  
Reprinted from “Measuring Social Value Orientation” by K. A. Ackermann, 2011, The 14th international 
conference on social dilemmas, July 9, Netherlands: Amsterdam. Reprinted with permission.  
 
Initially, SVO was only captured on the category level (e.g., by the Triple Dominance 
Measure; see Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997), posing the additional 
disadvantage of resulting in some unclassifiable individuals when allocation choices were too 
inconsistent to allow for an unambiguous classification (Murphy & Ackermann, 2014). 
Historically most influential was the Ring Measure (Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 1986; 
Liebrand & McClintock, 1988), which was the first to conceptualize SVO via the Cartesian 
SVO framework (as displayed in Figure 2). It not only classifies an individual to one of the four 
categories, but allows for the calculation of a continuous SVO angle that mirrors the degree of 
pro-sociality on a more fine-grained (continuous) level (see the exemplary angle delineated in 
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Figure 2). This gradual differentiation in weights beyond the integer values of -1, 0, and 1 are 
both conceptually meaningful and empirically supported (S. Fiedler et al., 2013). For instance, 
individuals often consider the other’s outcome but to a lesser extent than their own (e.g., 
Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001). Subsequent SVO measures such as the SVO Slider 
Measure (Murphy & Ackermann, 2014; Murphy et al., 2011) build upon the Cartesian SVO 
framework and provide a more economic measure of SVO by omitting some of the Ring 
Measure’s items that capture empirically less frequently observed phenomena (e.g., individuals 
choosing negative outcomes for themselves as, for instance, a masochistic individual would do, 
w1 = -1, w2 = 0; Murphy & Ackermann, 2014). In addition, it provides very good psychometric 
properties (e.g., a high test-retest reliability; see Murphy et al., 2011), which is why it is used 
as the SVO measure in this thesis. 
In terms of the relation between SVO, cooperation, and punishment behavior in social 
dilemmas, two aspects are noteworthy. First, cooperation behavior and SVO are distinct 
constructs, as SVO does not entail a strategic component affected by expectations regarding 
other’s behavior or a fear of being punished (Murphy & Ackermann, 2014). This independence 
allows one to unequivocally infer the underlying social preference (e.g., altruism vs. 
individualism). In contrast, cooperation behavior confounds social preferences and mentioned 
beliefs about others’ behavior (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). Second – and important when 
considering in the following SVO as the individual difference when investigating person-
situation interactions – SVO consists of a stable individual difference (Camerer & Fehr, 2004; 
Murphy et al., 2011) that reliably predicts cooperation behavior with a small to medium effect 
size of approximately r = .30 (see Balliet et al., 2009, for a meta-analysis). When correcting for 
publication bias, the correlation shrinks to r = .25 (Renkewitz, Fuchs, & Fiedler, 2011). The 
relation between SVO and punishment behavior, however, is less clear and empirical evidence 
is heterogeneous. On theoretical grounds, one would expect less punishment of proselfs who 
should prioritize the maximization of personal gain over costly restoration of outcome equality. 
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Additionally, prosocials, in particular, should punish to (re-)establish prosocial norms that 
protect them from being exploited. In line with this expectation, increased punishment of 
prosocials was shown by Bieleke, Gollwitzer, Oettingen, and Fischbacher (2016) as well as 
Haruno, Kimura, and Frith (2014). Rendering the empirical situation less clear, however, 
several null effects between punishment and SVO were found (Böckler, Tusche, & Singer, 
2016; Yamagishi et al., 2012) as well as even the reversed effect of reduced punishment for 
prosocials (Karagonlar & Kuhlman, 2013).  
Taken together, the original idea of only self-interested individuals has been extended 
within the framework of social preferences; and the idea of human rationality has adapted 
accordingly (Tetlock & Mellers, 2002). Several models of social preferences (Bolton & 
Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Van Lange, 1999) can account for why cooperation is 
the rational choice for some individuals – they gain utility not only from considering their own 
welfare but also from considering the outcome of others, albeit with different aims (e.g., 
competitors vs. prosocials) and to different degrees (e.g., altruists vs. prosocials). Thus, it is 
well established that individual differences explain variability in cooperation behavior. 
However, these cannot explain how a decision is made – that is, which cognitive processes are 
involved that might lead to differences in cooperation behavior. This investigation is outlined 
in the following, focusing on decision time as an indicator of cognitive processes and its relation 
with cooperation behavior. 
1.2 Cooperation as the default 
Research on economic decision making and pro-sociality, in particular, only recently 
began to investigate the underlying cognitive processes (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2010; S. Fiedler et 
al., 2013; Fischbacher et al., 2013; Lotito, Migheli, & Ortona, 2013; Rand et al., 2012; 
Rubinstein, 2007). In addition to physiological data such as eye-tracking (S. Fiedler et al., 2013) 
and neuroimaging (Smith, Bernheim, Camerer, & Rangel, 2014), decision time represents an 
efficient and non-obtrusive measure to draw inferences on the underlying cognitive processes 
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(for a review, see Spiliopoulos & Ortmann, 2018). By definition, it refers to the time needed or 
available to make a decision (Van de Calseyde, Keren, & Zeelenberg, 2014), typically measured 
from the onset when participants are presented with the screen where they can input their 
decision until they actually submit it (e.g., via mouse click). 
Conceptually, decision time has commonly been understood to allow the differentiation 
between deliberate and automatic-intuitive processes (Rubinstein, 2007). This differentiation is 
made in dual process models (for overviews, see J. S. B. Evans, 2007; J. S. B. Evans, 2008; 
Weber & Johnson, 2009) that “come in many flavors, but all distinguish cognitive operations 
that are quick and associative from others that are slow and rule-governed” (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002, p. 51). However, there is an ongoing discussion concerning different concepts 
that decision time may operationalize (A. M. Evans et al., 2015; A. M. Evans & Rand, 2018). 
Specifically, decision time was shown to increase with decision conflict, showing that long 
decision times cannot unequivocally be attributed to increased deliberation (A. M. Evans et al., 
2015; Krajbich et al., 2015). As this debate is highly relevant for the discussion of both articles 
(see Chapters 3.2.1 and 4.2.2), both perspectives are introduced in the following.  
Decision time in light of dual-process models  
Applying a dual process perspective on cooperation behavior in economic games allows 
one to address the question of which processes underlie cooperative decisions; whether there is 
“intuitive pro-sociality” (Zaki & Mitchell, 2013) or deliberation is required to behave pro-
socially. There are numerous dual process models that differ slightly in their specifications but 
all share the conceptual duality of the human mind (for an historical overview, see Frankish & 
Evans, 1983). In contrast to cognitively effortful, rule-based and slow deliberate processes, 
intuitive processes are assumed to be affect-based, associative, quick, and automatic (e.g., 
Epstein, 1994; J. S. B. Evans, 1984; Kahneman, 2003; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Sloman, 
1996; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The neutral description for both models consists of the system 
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1 vs. system 2 classification. System 1 refers to automatic, intuitive processing, whereas system 
2 represents the deliberate and rule-based account (Kahneman, 2003). Despite the variety of 
dual process models, they can be classified into one of two approaches according to how they 
propose intuition and deliberation to interact (J. S. B. Evans, 2008). The first category takes a 
default-interventionist perspective where “(…) rapid autonomous processes (…) [system 1] 
yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes 
[system 2]” (J. S. B. Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p. 223). That is, deliberation allows reviewing 
and, when indicated, overriding initial tendencies, as for instance assumed by Kahneman and 
Frederick (2002). In contrast, parallel-competitive models (e.g., Sloman, 1996) state that 
intuitive and deliberate processes are initiated simultaneously; either going hand in hand with 
one another when leading to the same decision or eliciting decision conflict when provoking 
contrary responses (J. S. B. Evans, 2007). There is no definitive answer yet as to how the 
intuitive and deliberate processes interact. However, the present relevant domain of 
spontaneous pro-sociality has recently been associated with the default-interventionist 
perspective (Mrkva, 2017). 
Based on the distinction between fast and automatic vs. slow and effortful processes, 
decision time received legitimacy as an operationalization of processing mode. As Alós-Ferrer 
and Strack (2014) noted “the first, obvious way to distinguish decision processes relies on the 
measurement of response times” (p. 2).4 That is, deliberation is assumed to increase with self-
paced decision time, whereas quick decisions are associated with an intuitive processing mode 
(Lotito et al., 2013; Nielsen, Tyran, & Wengström, 2014; Piovesan & Wengström, 2009; 
Rubinstein, 2007). Moreover, decision time can be experimentally manipulated: To elicit 
intuitive processing, time pressure is induced and contrasted against time delay or 
unconstrained decision time to allow for deliberation (Horstmann, Hausmann, & Ryf, 2009).5  
                                                 
4 Note that decision time and response time (RT) are synonymously used in this thesis. 
5 Notably, there are several other options to induce an intuitive vs. deliberate processing mode (e.g., cognitive 
load). For an overview, see Horstmann et al. (2009). 
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One criticism that recently gained importance concerns the reverse inference from the 
speed of decision time to the processing mode when the latter is operationalized as measured 
rather than manipulated decision time: According to the dual process perspective, intuitive 
decisions are fast whereas deliberation requires time. However, reversely inferring that quick 
decisions are necessarily intuitive depicts the classic fallacy of the affirmation of the consequent 
(see De Neys, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2005). Stated differently, other factors could account 
for short decision times above and beyond an intuitive processing mode. Supporting the fallacy 
on empirical grounds, decision conflict and a lacking strength of preference for a behavioral 
choice were recently shown to be positively related to decision time (A. M. Evans et al., 2015; 
Krajbich et al., 2015; Yamagishi et al., 2017). 
Decision time as an indicator of decision conflict 
The dual-process approach of spontaneous behavior has recently been challenged by 
showing that decision time reflects the degree of decision conflict (Diederich, 2003) even in the 
field of economics (for a review, see Clithero, 2018) and, more specifically, pro-sociality (A. 
M. Evans et al., 2015; Krajbich et al., 2015). Specifically, Krajbich et al. (2015) showed that 
the (lacking) strength of preference towards a choice option influences decision time of 
cooperation behavior in a public goods game. The authors varied the return (i.e., the MPCR 
factor, see Chapter 1.1) from contributing to the public good in order to manipulate the strength 
of preference towards cooperation. In doing so, they found that decision time is shorter for 
cooperative choices when a high return favors cooperation. Conversely, given a low return, 
defection is the faster choice. Complementing the findings of Krajbich et al. (2015), A. M. 
Evans et al. (2015) showed that self-indicated feelings of decision conflict also prolong decision 
time when deciding whether to cooperate in a public goods game (A. M. Evans et al., 2015; A. 
M. Evans & Rand, 2018). These findings are subsumed as the decision conflict hypothesis: If 
low decision conflict rather than intuitive processing is reflected in short decision times, then 
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decision extremes (i.e., fully cooperative as well as fully defective behavior such as giving all 
versus nothing in a public goods game) but not only fully cooperative decisions should be fast. 
The rationale behind this notion is that cooperation and defection alike can be accompanied by 
low decision conflict – in that there is a clear strength of preference for either one of the choice 
options – and can thus both be expressed spontaneously. Solving decision conflict requires time 
and leads to intermediate levels of cooperativeness (A. M. Evans et al., 2015). The assumed 
relation when predicting decision time by cooperation behavior takes on an inverted u-shaped 
pattern with short decision times at both ends of the cooperative spectrum and increased 
decision time in the case of intermediate cooperativeness. In turn, manipulating an intuitive 
processing mode has been shown to increase only cooperation behavior, but neither decision 
extremes nor self-indicated feelings of conflictedness (A. M. Evans et al., 2015).   
On theoretical grounds, the decision conflict hypothesis and the resulting inverted u-
shaped pattern is reflected in evidence accumulation models (also known as sequential 
sampling, information accumulation or drift diffusion models; e.g., Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). 
They posit one process of judgment and decision making rather than differentiating between 
two systems and thus stand in contrast to the dual process approach (Coricelli, Polonio, & 
Vostroknutov, forthcoming; Spiliopoulos & Ortmann, 2018). Krajbich et al. (2015) emphasized 
that “it is critically important to consider the possibility that there may just be a single 
deliberative process governing choices, and that variations in RT [decision time] are due to the 
perceived similarity of the choice options and not competing processes” (p. 2). In other words, 
in contrast to the dual process account, evidence accumulation models assume a single decision 
process. Predicted decision time varies depending on the amount of information that must be 
processed in order to exceed a certain decision threshold (Klauer, 2014). The higher the decision 
conflict, the more information must be acquired – as a result, the decision process takes longer 
(Krajbich & Rangel, 2011). Taken together, when measuring rather than manipulating decision 
time – as done in the articles in this thesis – one must take into account the fact that decision 
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time may not only capture an intuitive processing mode. This requires the use of the term 
spontaneous rather than intuitive behavior when referring to short decision times.6 
However, it would fall short to assign the incorporation of decision conflict only to 
single-process models. Dual-process models, as well, include decision conflict and its 
resolution: In their reply to Krajbich et al. (2015), Pennycook, Fugelsang, Koehler, and 
Thompson (2016) picked up the argument from parallel-competitive models (e.g., Sloman, 
1996, 2014) that low decision conflict is a prerequisite for intuitive decision-making. In the case 
of decision conflict, it is immediately detected (De Neys, 2012, 2014; De Neys & Glumicic, 
2008) and causes deliberation (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015; Pennycook et al., 
2016). Therefore, short decision times as the reflection of the individual default might contain 
both low decision conflict and intuitive processing. The strength of preference for one option 
(i.e., the degree of decision conflict) would then determine how quick and intuitive a decision 
can be made or whether deliberation is required to solve decision conflict.  
As a current development, there is the striving to combine the dual process approach 
with evidence accumulation models (Achtziger & Alós-Ferrer, 2013; Alós‐Ferrer, 2018; Chen 
& Krajbich, 2018), even though the application of the latter on strategic choices is still in its 
infancy (Coricelli et al., forthcoming). Given the ongoing debate regarding the different 
interpretations of decision time (see Konovalov & Krajbich, 2019), it is important to clarify that 
the first article of this thesis (Mischkowski & Glöckner, 2016) consists of a direct replication 
of the first study of Rand et al. (2012) that measures decision time and is based on the dual 
process perspective. As the debate regarding the entanglement of intuitive processing and 
decision conflict gained importance since the publications of A. M. Evans et al. (2015) and 
Krajbich et al. (2015), the second paper (Mischkowski, Glöckner, & Lewisch, 2018) integrates 
the decision conflict perspective when reviewing the theoretical background and discussing the 
                                                 
6 The term “spontaneous” behavior stems from Rand et al. (2012). 
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results. However, as mentioned above, the influence of decision conflict has not yet been 
empirically tested for this thesis’ articles. Therefore, in Chapters 3.2.1 and 4.2.2 the 
corresponding analyses are conducted to contribute to the debate concerning whether short 
decision times are also attributable to low decision conflict. 
After discussing the general theoretical framework by introducing the central variables 
of this thesis – cooperation and punishment behavior, SVO, and decision time – it is time to 
shed light on their relation. Specifically, the theoretical and methodological details of the 
spontaneous cooperation effect are introduced in the following before summarizing replication 
attempts and identifying moderators to outline the research question of the first article. 
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2. The spontaneous cooperation effect – Replication attempts and identified 
moderators 
In the following, I will introduce the spontaneous cooperation effect and its underlying 
theory, the Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH). I will then summarize replication attempts and 
identified moderators to outline the scientific debate on the spontaneous cooperation effect that 
has evolved since the original publication in 2012.  
2.1 The Spontaneous Cooperation Effect 
In their original publication, Rand et al. (2012) made two major contributions: First, 
they investigated the underlying processes of cooperation behavior by testing the influence of 
an intuitive vs. deliberate processing mode. Second, they contributed fundamentally 
contradicting evidence against the classic economic perspective by showing that cooperation is 
the first and spontaneously executed response in one-shot interactions.  
Overall, the authors conducted ten studies in which they correlatively measured decision 
time as well as manipulated an intuitive vs. deliberate processing mode in several ways (e.g., 
via time pressure vs. time delay; priming an intuitive vs. reflective mindset).7 Their results 
showed a continuous decrease of cooperation behavior in one-shot social dilemmas (e.g., 
prisoner’s dilemmas and public good games) the longer participants took to make a decision 
(see Figure 3).  
                                                 
7 To prime intuitive or deliberate processing, Rand et al. (2012) asked participants to remember either good or 
bad experiences with decisions made in one of the processing modes. Intuition is primed when participants are 
asked to remember a positive outcome of a decision that was made intuitively and a negative experience after 
having decided in a deliberate manner (and vice versa for the prime of deliberation). 
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Figure 3. The spontaneous cooperation effect. With increasing, self-paced (i.e., measured) 
decision time, cooperation behavior operationalized as the percentual contributions in a one-
shot public goods game decreases.  
Reprinted from “Spontaneous giving and calculated greed” by D. G. Rand, J. D. Greene and M. A. Nowak, 2012, 
Nature, 489, p. 427. Copyright 2019 by Springer Nature. Reprinted with permission. 
 
Additionally, when manipulating processing mode, the results showed statistically 
significant higher cooperation rates in comparison to a time delay manipulation (see Figure 4). 
The authors concluded that an intuitive compared to a deliberate processing mode increases 
cooperation behavior, suggesting an intervention opportunity that even allows one to promote 
cooperation. This implication is critical, given the outlined importance of social dilemmas in 
real life (e.g., prevention of climate change; see Chapter 1.1).8 
 
                                                 
8 Note that a control condition containing unconstrained decision time was taken from the first, correlative study 
of Rand et al. (2012). It indicated a non-significant difference in contributions to the time pressure condition at the 
conventional alpha-level of 5% (p = .058; see Figure 4). As Everett, Ingbretsen, Cushman, and Cikara (2017) point 
out, a control condition is needed to infer whether an intuitive processing mode increases or deliberation decreases 
cooperative behavior. Their results point even more clearly to the latter, suggesting deliberate defection rather than 
spontaneous cooperation, thus contradicting the claim of Rand et al. (2012).  
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Figure 4. Spontaneous cooperation effect when manipulating decision time. Cooperation 
behavior (operationalized as percentual contributions) in a public goods game is significantly 
higher when participants are under time pressure (i.e., forced to decide in less than 10 seconds) 
in contrast to a time delay condition in which participants were forced to wait at least 10 seconds 
before entering their contribution decision. The unconstrained condition reflects self-paced 
(i.e., measured) decision time for contributions.  
Reprinted from “Spontaneous giving and calculated greed” by D. G. Rand, J. D. Greene and M. A. Nowak, 2012, 
Nature, 489, p. 428. Copyright 2019 by Springer Nature. Reprinted with permission. 
 
The Social Heuristics Hypothesis  
Based on these results, Rand and colleagues postulated the Social Heuristics Hypothesis 
(SHH, Bear & Rand, 2016; Rand et al., 2014) to provide a post-hoc explanation of the 
spontaneous cooperation effect. The SHH states from an evolutionary perspective that 
cooperation has been internalized as the beneficial strategy in daily-life interactions where one-
shot settings are comparably rare. Rather, daily-life interactions mostly consist of repeated, non-
anonymous interactions that include a potential threat of being sanctioned and thus elicit 
spontaneous cooperation. Hence, deliberation is required to adapt to the artificial lab situation 
that favors defection. To encounter failed replications that were published in the meantime (e.g., 
Tinghög et al., 2013, see subsequent Chapter 2.2), Rand et al. (2014) acknowledge that 
spontaneous cooperation consists of an “averaged phenomenon” and postulate that for some 
individuals defection might be anchored as the first and intuitive response. This could be rooted 
in prior experience with the laboratory setting of social dilemma experiments (Rand et al., 2012) 
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– that is, individuals who spontaneously defect internalized defection in contexts that do not 
support cooperation (Rand et al., 2014). Still, the authors provide a falsifiable theory in that 
they state that “intuition should never decrease average cooperation relative to reflection in one-
shot anonymous social dilemmas” (Rand et al., 2014, p. 2).  
From a methodological perspective, the original studies showing spontaneous 
cooperation suggested an easily replicable effect. The authors built their findings on sufficiently 
powered lab and online studies with both student and non-student samples (i.e., MTurk workers, 
see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). However, roughly seven years after the original 
publication, the spontaneous cooperation effect is still highly debated and new evidence – for 
and against the effect – is constantly added (e.g., Bouwmeester et al., 2017; Everett et al., 2017; 
Isler, Maule, & Starmer, 2018; Kvarven et al., 2019; Rand, 2016, 2017a, 2017b). In the 
following, replication attempts are evaluated in more detail before identified moderators are 
summarized to shed light on the potential sources that may underlie the heterogeneous 
replication results. 
2.2 Replication attempts 
The first replication attempt after the original publication was published by Tinghög et 
al. (2013) who elicited the debate by five studies, including a direct as well as several conceptual 
replication analyses. The authors consistently found a null effect of manipulated decision time 
on cooperation behavior. Furthermore, they pointed to a potential selection bias in the original 
publication, as Rand et al. (2012) only included time compliant participants (i.e., participants 
who took too long in the time pressure condition or responded too early in the time delay 
condition were excluded).9  
                                                 
9 Additionally, Tinghög et al. (2013) criticized Rand et al. (2012) for incorrectly controlling for compliance with 
the time pressure constraint in their analyses after having excluded non-compliant participants. Thereupon, Rand 
and colleagues replied that the effect persists when including participants who exceeded the time limit (Rand, 
Greene, & Nowak, 2013). Similarly, they argued that controlling for time limit compliance was not necessary to 
detect the effect. As subsequent replication studies provided contradictory evidence (Bouwmeester et al., 2017), 
this debate is still ongoing (Everett et al., 2017; Rand, 2017a) and is evaluated in more detail in the following of 
this chapter. 
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Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester (2014) corroborated the doubts regarding the replicability 
in that they also found no difference in cooperation behavior when manipulating decision time. 
Capraro and Cococcioni (2016) even showed increased cooperation under time delay when 
increasing the forced time to deliberate up to 30 seconds instead of 10 seconds. However, some 
studies also successfully replicated the spontaneous cooperation effect when manipulating an 
intuitive processing mode: Here, different manipulations were used to induce an intuitive 
processing mode; Protzko, Ouimette, and Schooler (2016) relied on the classic time pressure 
vs. time delay induction, whereas Lotz (2015) applied the priming manipulation of Rand et al. 
(2012) to induce intuitive vs. deliberate processing.  
Results of replication attempts that measured decision time are similarly heterogeneous. 
Some correlative studies successfully replicated spontaneous cooperation behavior in social 
dilemmas (Lotito et al., 2013; Nielsen et al., 2014), whereas others even identified contrary 
results, showing increased decision time for cooperative behavior in a public goods game (S. 
Fiedler et al., 2013; Lohse, Goeschl, & Diederich, 2016).  
This opaque situation required meta-analytical clarification and was addressed in two 
articles in Psychological Science that concentrated the debate to its current essence: First, Rand 
(2016) provided extensive, meta-analytic support for the spontaneous cooperation effect and, 
thus, evidence for the SHH. However, a many-labs registered replication report (Bouwmeester 
et al., 2017) conducted a direct replication of the time pressure study by Rand et al. (2012) and 
refreshed the debate about a potential selection bias (see Tinghög et al., 2013): The effect only 
appeared when excluding participants who did not obey the time limit constraint (i.e., took too 
long in the time pressure condition or responded too early in the time delay condition). Even 
though further analyses in Rand’s reply (Rand, 2017a) and a subsequent article by Everett et al. 
(2017) countered the concern about a potential selection bias, the meta-analysis and registered 
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replication report provide the largest datasets to date to evaluate the replicability of the 
spontaneous cooperation effect.10 
Finally, the most recent direct replication attempt was made within a large scale 
replication project that aimed at replicating all feasible studies of two of the most prestigious 
interdisciplinary journals, Science and Nature, published between 2010 and 2015 (Camerer et 
al., 2018). The spontaneous cooperation effect was among the effects that have been tested for 
their replicability. Preventing the difficulty of a potential selection bias, the authors refrained 
from using time pressure to induce intuitive processing and instead relied on the priming 
manipulation of Rand et al. (2012). Still, the spontaneous cooperation effect was not found. 
However, Rand (2018) replied that against his advice, the authors did not include prior 
experience with economic games in their analyses, which he showed to be a moderator of 
spontaneous cooperation (see Rand et al., 2012). When only including inexperienced 
participants, there is indeed a similar effect size of spontaneous cooperation comparable to the 
original paper in 2012 (Rand, 2018). 
Summarizing the status quo, replication results are mixed and potential reasons are 
mainly discussed on methodological rather than theoretical grounds. The largest replication 
from an independent author group is provided by the many-labs replication project 
(Bouwmeester et al., 2017), which shows that for a manipulated processing mode, the 
spontaneous cooperation effect is – if at all – small in size and requires the exclusion of non-
compliant (or experienced, see Rand, 2018) participants to appear. Correlative studies 
measuring decision time as an approximation of the degree of deliberation, in contrast, find 
evidence of the effect in both directions, suggesting the interplay of moderators. Several studies 
have investigated interacting state and trait factors of spontaneous cooperation, which are 
                                                 
10 Rand (2017) tackled in his comment the potential selection bias and analyzed whether there are any relations 
between additional variables assessed in the replication project (e.g., comprehension of payoff structure, prior 
experience with economic games) and time limit exceedance without finding any evidence of a selection bias. 
Everett et al. (2017) succeeded to design an experiment that reduces the percentage of non-compliant 
participants a priori, replicating reduced cooperation behavior under deliberation.  
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presented in the following. They lead towards the research question of the first paper, which 
investigates whether spontaneous cooperation is conditional on dispositional pro-sociality.  
2.3 Identified moderators 
The identification of moderators helps to unify some, at first glance, contradictory findings 
as presented in the above discussion of heterogeneous replication results concerning the 
spontaneous cooperation effect. As already indicated, experience with the laboratory social 
dilemma setting has been shown to moderate spontaneous cooperation in that only naïve 
individuals transfer their cooperative default to the lab setting (McAuliffe, Forster, Pedersen, 
& McCullough, 2018; Rand et al., 2012; Rand et al., 2014). A further situational moderator 
refers to the understanding of the social dilemma situation (Stromland, Tjotta, & Torsvik, 2018) 
as a necessary prerequisite for spontaneous cooperation. When individuals do not understand 
the monetary consequences of their decision, the difference in cooperation behavior between 
an intuitive vs. deliberate processing mode vanishes. 
 In addition to the interaction with experience in the laboratory setting, Rand et al. (2012) 
showed that only individuals with a highly trusting attitude towards the cooperativeness of their 
daily-life interaction partners cooperate spontaneously. In line with those findings, beliefs about 
the other players’ cooperativeness were identified to moderate spontaneous cooperation: Santa 
et al. (2018) manipulated expectations and showed that cooperative choices are made faster 
with increasing (positive) beliefs. For defective choices, the opposite is true in that they become 
slower with increasing expected cooperativeness. The authors attribute the results to the 
importance of the social context that determines the speed of cooperation. 
Turning to stable individual difference factors, the influence of cultural and demographic 
factors were tested for their moderating influence on spontaneous cooperation: Nishi, 
Christakis, and Rand (2017) showed the influence of intercultural differences in that Indians 
did not cooperate spontaneously and defected overall to a greater degree than US-Americans. 
The authors only speculate about the underlying reasons and focus on prosocial norms that are 
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particularly developed in countries with high institutional quality (e.g., with a low level of 
corruption; Peysakhovich & Rand, 2015; Stagnaro, Arechar, & Rand, 2017).  
Underlining the conceptual distinctiveness of altruism vs. cooperation behavior (see part of 
Chapter 1.1 on SVO), Rand, Brescoll, Everett, Capraro, and Barcelo (2016) showed that 
spontaneous altruism – in contrast to spontaneous cooperation (Rand, 2017b) – is conditional 
on gender. Specifically, there were gender differences regarding the intuitiveness of dictator 
game giving in that only females have internalized altruistic giving (Rand et al., 2016). In turn, 
men and women alike behaved intuitively prosocial in social dilemmas where cooperation 
increases the joint outcome in contrast to distributing a fixed amount as in dictator games (Rand, 
2017b).  
Continuing this perspective from whom spontaneous cooperation might be expected, 
spontaneous cooperation has also been investigated in terms of its dependence on basic 
personality traits. Specifically, Kieslich and Hilbig (2014) assessed spontaneous cooperation in 
a mouse-tracking paradigm. The authors showed that the effect is more pronounced for 
individuals high in honesty-humility, a basic trait of the six factor personality model HEXACO 
(Ashton & Lee, 2007; Lee & Ashton, 2004) reflecting active pro-sociality (Hilbig, Zettler, Leist, 
& Heydasch, 2013). In particular, honesty-humility represents the tendency to be fair and 
genuine in dealing with others, contrasted against greedy, insincere, and manipulative 
behavioral tendencies (Ashton & Lee, 2008).  
To summarize, spontaneous cooperation was shown to be conditional on diverse situational 
and personality factors. As an attempt to systematize these and find common ground, the 
situational factors (e.g., positive expectations or trust in others’ cooperativeness, existence of 
prosocial norms) point out that the fear of being exploited must be minimal in order to express 
spontaneous cooperation behavior. Individual differences (e.g., a dispositional pro-sociality as 
honesty-humility), in turn, represent person-situation interactions – an approach that the first 
paper elaborates on by investigating SVO as a moderator of spontaneous cooperation.
UNIFYING HETEROGENEOUS REPLICATION RESULTS 36 
 
3. Unifying heterogeneous replication results – Spontaneous cooperation behavior is 
conditional on dispositional pro-sociality 
Summarizing the vast amount of research on spontaneous cooperation, the reason why the 
original publication caught that amount of interest might be due to the strong contradiction of 
rational choice assumptions. Even though social preferences are widely acknowledged, the 
emphasis on the intuitive component of cooperation behavior contradicts the assumption that 
prosocial behavior needs effortful persuasion rather than constituting the default (e.g., Chen & 
Fischbacher, 2016; Piovesan & Wengström, 2009). Additionally, the effect settles in the time 
of the replication crisis in social psychology (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), where the 
scientific community speaks out against spectacular, but non-replicable findings. 
Identifying person-situation interactions, for whom spontaneous cooperation is valid, 
allows one to unify heterogeneous replication results and provides the starting point for the 
research question of the first paper of this thesis (Mischkowski & Glöckner, 2016). Specifically, 
it is hypothesized that prosocials but not proselfs – as measured by SVO – cooperate 
spontaneously but override their prosocial default with longer deliberation. This was expected 
for several reasons: As outlined in Chapter 1.1, SVO (e.g., Van Lange, 1999) represents a 
disposition of how strongly individuals consider another persons’ outcome that is stable over 
time (Camerer & Fehr, 2004; Murphy et al., 2011) and highly predictive of cooperation 
behavior (Balliet et al., 2009). Furthermore, SVO is expressed automatically: Cornelissen, 
Dewitte, and Warlop (2011) showed increased giving in dictator games for prosocials under 
cognitive load, indicating that even without available cognitive resources, prosocials comply 
with their social preference.  
Additionally, SVO was shown to be related to honesty-humility (Hilbig, Glöckner, & 
Zettler, 2014; Mischkowski, Thielmann, & Glöckner, 2018, 2019); both concepts capturing 
dispositional pro-sociality (for the stability of SVO, see Murphy et al., 2011). Given that there 
is a cooperative default for individuals high in honesty-humility (Kieslich & Hilbig, 2014), it is 
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straightforward to test whether this interaction effect is also valid for prosocials as measured by 
SVO. Related to the already identified moderators of trust and expectations regarding the 
cooperativeness of others, prosocials have more heterogeneous but also more positive 
expectations, on average, regarding other individuals’ cooperativeness (Kelley & Stahelski, 
1970; Van Lange, 1992). These interaction effects might therefore be rooted in differences in 
SVO.  
To summarize, the aim of the first paper of this thesis was twofold. First, it is 
investigated whether the spontaneous cooperation effect is conditional on dispositional pro-
sociality (i.e., SVO). Second, the three studies consist of a direct replication of the first study 
by Rand et al. (2012) that was only extended by an assessment of SVO. This made it possible 
to similarly test for the main effect that might appear given a predominant number of prosocials 
in the studies. To validate the results of SVO with the related but broader basic personality trait 
dimension honesty-humility, the spontaneous cooperation effect for individuals high in 
honesty-humility as shown by Kieslich and Hilbig (2014) was tested for its replicability. To do 
so, the study with the highest power containing a representative sample for the US and German 
population also included the HEXACO personality inventory (Ashton & Lee, 2007; Ashton & 
Lee, 2008). Doing so made it also possible to test whether SVO is predictive of spontaneous 
cooperation beyond honesty-humility – that is, whether the potential interaction effect of 
spontaneous cooperation for prosocials persists when controlling for the interaction between 
honesty-humility and decision time and vice versa. 
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3.1 1st Article: Spontaneous cooperation for prosocials but not for proselfs: Social 






































Materials, analysis scripts, and data can be found at: https://osf.io/w7hsk/ 
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The first paper supports a cooperative default for dispositional prosocials, meaning that 
these individuals cooperate spontaneously but reduce their cooperation behavior with 
increasing decision time. Proselfs, in turn, consistently behave in a more selfish manner, 
irrespective of decision time. As dispositional pro-sociality may vary among different samples 
used to investigate spontaneous cooperation, some of the failed replications (i.e., null effects) 
might be the result of a predominantly proself sample. 
3.2.1 Differentiating between decision conflict and intuitive processing 
It is still unclear which concepts are operationalized by self-paced decision time, namely 
whether it confounds decision conflict and intuitive processing (see Chapter 1.2). To reiterate, 
short decision times do not necessarily (only) capture intuitive processing but were also shown 
to reflect low decision conflict (A. M. Evans et al., 2015; Krajbich et al., 2015). Specifically, 
A. M. Evans et al. (2015) provide evidence for an inverse u-shaped pattern when predicting 
decision time with cooperation behavior: Both fully cooperative and defective choices (e.g., 
contributing everything or nothing to a public good) were made more quickly than partly 
cooperative choices (e.g., contributing about half of the amount to the public good). This 
behavioral pattern is predicted by single process models (e.g., evidence accumulation models) 
that attribute longer decision times to increased decision conflict (e.g., Klauer, 2014) and, 
therefore, challenge the common practice of inferring how intuitive vs. deliberate individuals 
decided dependent on their self-paced decision time. Additionally, A. M. Evans et al. (2015) 
showed that decision time mediates the relation between self-indicated decision conflict and 
decision extremities in that low conflict decisions were made more quickly and led to more 
extreme (that is highly cooperative and highly defective) decisions. The conceptual distinction 
between measured and manipulated decision time was further supported by the fact that 
manipulating decision time increased cooperation behavior – as suggested by the SHH – but it 
did not influence decision conflict or decision extremes. Taken together, this evidence supports 
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the so-called decision conflict hypothesis, which led to the conclusion that a reverse inference 
on the processing mode based on decision times is invalid.  
The studies conducted in Mischkowski and Glöckner (2016) allow one to test whether 
the findings by A. M. Evans et al. (2015) are replicable. Therefore, I conducted the 
corresponding additional analyses, checking for a potential inverse u-shaped pattern of the 
relation between decision time and cooperation behavior. Specifically, this required two 
additional analyses. First, I applied the regression model by A. M. Evans et al. (2015), testing 
whether decision extremes as absolute deviations from average cooperation behavior (i.e., the 
absolute difference from the descriptive scale mean of contributions) are faster than 
intermediate contributions. Second, as a robustness check, I tested whether the relation between 
contributions and decision times is (inversely) u-shaped. Specifically, this was accomplished 
by including a quadratic term of contributions as an additional predictor in the regression model 
predicting decision time by contributions. 
Descriptive statistics of the relevant variables are comprehensively provided in Table 1. 
Concerning the first analysis, I relied on the same regression model used by A. M. Evans et al. 
(2015) to investigate whether extreme (i.e., very high and very low) contributions are faster. 
Therefore, logarithmized decision time was regressed on the contributions as well as on the 
absolute difference of contributions to the scale mean.11 Similar to the findings by A. M. Evans 
et al. (2015), this analysis showed a negative relationship between decision extremes and 
decision time (β = -.10, p = .009). Note, however, that the negative relation between 
contributions and decision time (i.e., the spontaneous cooperation effect) was observed, as well 
(β = -.16, p < .001), even when controlling for decision extremes. This is in line with the 
explanation that in largely prosocial samples (as it is true for the data of Mischkowski and 
                                                 
11 Following A. M. Evans et al. (2015), both predictors were centered on the sample mean. Furthermore, 
consistent with the analyses in Mischkowski and Glöckner (2016), two study dummies are included to control 
for potential differences among the three studies. In addition, decision time was logarithmized to approximate a 
normal distribution (Mayerl, 2009). 
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Glöckner (2016) where 70.9% in the overall analysis were prosocial according to their SVO 
angle), the relation between decision time and contributions is negative (A. M. Evans et al., 
2015).  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the relevant variables of the additional analyses 
 Mean (SD) Min Max 
Contributions (in %) 61.47 (41.71) 0 100 
Decision extremes 38.50 (15.99) 1.47 61.47 
Decision Time (in sec.) 11.90 (10.52) 2.00 86.00 
Decision Time (log 10 sec.)  0.98 (0.27) 0.30 1.93 
Note. Decision extremes consist of the absolute difference of contributions to the scale mean. 
  
Even though the operationalization of decision extremes and their negative relation with 
decision time hints toward an inverse u-shaped pattern between contributions and decision time, 
it does not explicitly test for the curvilinear trend. The most common procedure to test such a 
pattern implies including a squared term of the relevant predictor (in this case, contributions) 
in the regression model (Simonsohn, 2018). However, this procedure has been criticized in the 
past, arguing that a significant squared term does not provide sufficient evidence to infer a u-
shaped pattern and might thus lead to false, alpha-inflated conclusions (Lind & Mehlum, 2010; 
Simonsohn, 2018). Following the approach of Lind and Mehlum (2010), testing for significance 
of the squared term and analyzing whether the estimated extremum of the curve is within the 
data range only represents necessary but not sufficient evidence. To account for the latter, one 
must additionally test whether the steepness of the curve (i.e., the slope) significantly increases 
on the left-hand side of the extremum point and decreases on its right-hand side.12 The 
corresponding analyses were conducted using the Stata module provided by Lind and Mehlum 
                                                 
12 Specifically, Lind and Mehlum (2007, 2010) test the slope of the tangent at the lowest and highest value of the 
predictor (i.e., at the minimum and maximum of contributions). 
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(2007). The results are in line with the previous finding of decision extremes: When regressing 
logarithmized decision time on mean-centered contributions and their squared term, there is a 
small-sized negative relation between the squared contributions and decision time, providing 
preliminary evidence of an inverse u-shaped pattern (β = -.12, p = .009, see Figure 5).13  
 
Figure 5. Prediction of decision time as a function of contributions and their squared term. 
Grey-dashed lines denote the 95% confidence interval.  
 
More specifically, there is a significant positive slope on the left hand-side of the 
extremum point of cooperative choices predicting decision time (b = .002, p = .03), the 
extremum being at 38.99% of contributions.14 Correspondingly, the upper bound indicates a 
significant decrease in contributions (b = -.003, p < .001, see Figure 5).   
                                                 
13 Contributions are mean-centered to avoid multicollinearity to their squared term. For illustrative purposes, the 
graph contains non-centered contributions. The regression model again includes two study dummies. Note, that 
the effect of contributions on decision time remains significant (β = -.18, p < .001), indicating that the linear 
relation persists even when controlling for the curvilinear trend. 
14 The reported extremum is corrected for the linear shift of mean-centered contributions. 
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3.2.2 Implications for spontaneous cooperation (of prosocials) 
Summarizing these results in terms of their implications, they support – despite the small 
effect size – the assumption that decision conflict and intuitive processing mode are entangled 
when measuring decision time. Not only cooperative decisions but also defective choices as 
compared to intermediate choices are made faster. Thus, the data of the thesis’ first article 
supports the terminology of spontaneous (rather than intuitive) cooperation. However, the 
inverted u-shaped pattern as an indicator of decision conflict is only one part of the results of 
A. M. Evans et al. (2015) and does not sufficiently allow for testing the confounding influence 
of decision conflict. For instance, the data of the first article did not contain any self-rating 
measures of decision conflict and thus cannot investigate whether these would relate to decision 
time. In addition, the distinction between decision conflict and intuitive processing also rests 
on the finding that cooperation, but not decision extremes, increase when individuals are under 
time pressure (A. M. Evans et al., 2015). However, given that the spontaneous cooperation 
effect is not reliably found (see Chapter 2.2) and highly debated in terms of a potential selection 
bias (see Bouwmeester et al., 2017; Tinghög et al., 2013), the possibility remains that decision 
conflict is also influential when manipulating decision time: Future research could investigate 
whether mainly those individuals who experience high decision conflict exceed the time 
pressure limit, as the arbitrary decision time limit of ten seconds chosen by Rand et al. (2012) 
still offers the potential that individuals may experience some degree of decision conflict and 
deliberation (Myrseth & Wollbrant, 2017). If so, there might be a correlation between decision 
conflict and time limit exceedance. Given that the spontaneous cooperation effect is only found 
for those individuals who comply with the time constraint (Bouwmeester et al., 2017), low 
decision conflict might be a prerequisite for spontaneous cooperation – be it for self-paced or 
manipulated decision time. 
In addition, marginalizing potential differences between measured vs. manipulated 
decision time on theoretical grounds, one must keep in mind that manipulating an intuitive 
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processing mode does not shape the default but rather triggers a reliance on it. Stated differently, 
putting individuals under time pressure does not inherently increase pro-sociality as Rand et al. 
(2012) suggested, but only causes individuals to rely on their disposition, which can imply any 
social preference. As outlined in the following, future research should attempt to combine rather 
than separate investigations on cognitive processes underlying cooperation behavior. 
3.2.3 Further development of the spontaneous cooperation effect and the Social 
Heuristics Hypothesis 
Following the results of A. M. Evans et al. (2015) and Krajbich et al. (2015), Rand 
(2016) considered only manipulated but not measured decision time as a valid 
operationalization for an intuitive, respectively deliberate processing mode. Given the 
heterogeneous replication results for the spontaneous cooperation effect – also when 
manipulating the processing mode – the subsequent discussion in the field of spontaneous 
cooperation mainly focuses on debating the right (usage of) processing mode manipulation. 
However, hardly any attention is directed towards the underlying theory. On an empirical level, 
the focus is directed towards replication studies – which is an important step in itself (see Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015) – knowing that the SHH will at some point lose its right to exist 
when its most prominent effect (the effect on which the theory was built post-hoc) is not 
replicable. However, the pure methodological discussion appears to be insufficient for 
evaluating and revising the theory. To move the debate forward on theoretical grounds, it is 
important to assess how to improve (i.e., revise) the theory underlying the spontaneous 
cooperation effect. To do so, the following chapter deals with the evaluation of the SHH based 
on scientific-theoretical criteria of the critical rationalism, namely the empirical content as 
described by Karl Popper (1934/2005). Thereby, the articles of this thesis can be embedded in 
a more general analysis of what the SHH provides in terms of its theoretical value (i.e., its 
empirical content) as well as how the results of the first paper and the hypotheses of the second 
paper can improve it.  
FROM SPONTANEOUS COOPERATION TO SPONTANEOUS PUNISHMENT 50 
4. From spontaneous cooperation to spontaneous punishment 
– Towards a more general theory of spontaneous pro-sociality? 
From a meta-scientific perspective, the debate about the spontaneous cooperation effect 
and its corresponding theory, the SHH, demonstrates in a prototypical way the phenomenon in 
(social) psychological research of focusing on proving effects rather than testing theories (K. 
Fiedler, 2004; Kruglanski, 2004). As many of these “effects” were not replicable, the question 
was raised whether psychology was caught in a replication crisis (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 
2012; Yong, 2012), initiating diverse replication initiatives not only in the field of social 
psychology (e.g., Camerer et al., 2018; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). The following 
chapter reflects on the core of replicability by focusing on the need of theorizing based on the 
specific examples of the spontaneous cooperation effect and the underlying SHH. Based on an 
analysis of its original formulation (Rand et al., 2014), the accomplishments of research on 
spontaneous cooperation in terms of improving its empirical content and explaining what future 
research must do to develop the theory further become visible. Therefore, this chapter has two 
aims: First, it evaluates the SHH as underlying theory of the spontaneous cooperation effect 
according to the criterion of its empirical content (Popper, 1934/2005). Based on this 
evaluation, it delineates the research question of this thesis’ second paper, investigating the 
generalizability of spontaneous cooperation towards a (potential) theory of spontaneous pro-
sociality. 
Starting with a chronological retrospection, the spontaneous cooperation effect was 
published first (Rand et al., 2012), before inductively inferring the SHH (Rand et al., 2014). In 
line with a “Confirm-early/ disconfirm late” strategy (Manktelow, 2012), Rand and colleagues 
primarily published confirmatory results in the following years, making use of re-analysis of 
large datasets that provide support for the SHH (e.g., Cone & Rand, 2014; Nishi et al., 2017; 
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Rand, 2016, 2017b; Rand et al., 2016).15 Several direct and conceptual replication attempts – 
both successful and unsuccessful (e.g., Lotz, 2015; Tinghög et al., 2013, see Chapter 2.2) – 
focused on the effect rather than the underlying theory. However, this effect-focused debate 
concerning heterogeneous replication results shifted towards a methodological dispute about 
how to operationalize and manipulate processing mode (Bouwmeester et al., 2017; Rand, 
2017a), rather than questioning the quality of the theory. Up until now, the methodological 
debate about the SHH appears to be circular: Either there is confirmatory support for the theory 
(e.g., Everett et al., 2017; Isler et al., 2018) or seemingly methodological flaws prevent finding 
supportive evidence (see Mosleh & Rand, 2018; Rand, 2018). This reasoning, however, is 
highly dangerous when keeping in mind that science should primarily seek to maximize the 
gain of knowledge by falsifying wrong theories (Popper, 1934/2005).16  
The criteria to evaluate the value of a scientific theory – or even the legitimacy to call it 
scientific – were introduced by Karl Popper (1934/2005). His concept of a theory’s empirical 
content provides the opportunity to exit this circular debate and focus on how modifying the 
SHH based on previous results increases the theory’s empirical content. Specifically, an 
analysis of a theory’s empirical content can be accomplished by considering two criteria: the 
question about (i) which individuals and situations the theory can be applied to (i.e., its scope 
conditions or level of universality or generality) and (ii) which behavioral patterns the theory 
actually forbids in its areas of application (its degree of precision or specificity).  
In line with this reasoning, I will analyze the SHH according to its empirical content in 
the following and outline how identifying social value orientation (SVO) as a moderator of 
spontaneous cooperation increases its specificity. Transitioning to the second paper, this 
similarly aims at contributing to the SHH’s empirical content, though with a different focus on 
                                                 
15 This strategy shall not be criticized; it is often observed (Dunbar, 1995) and, more importantly, also rational in 
terms of confirming a theory’s right to exist first before determining its boundaries. 
16 Note that Popper (1934/2005) considers a priori every theory to be wrong, as theories consist of simplified 
reflections of reality. Falsification thus refers to the aim of disproving one’s theory by testing its boundaries – or 
as put by Platt (1964) by designing an experiment that could disprove one’s hypothesis rather than confirm it.  
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its generalizability (via testing its level of universality). Specifically, it investigates whether the 
negative relation between decision time and elementary cooperation also applies for 
instrumental cooperation, that is for punishment behavior.17 
Starting with the analysis of the SHH’s empirical content requires the identification of 
the theory’s original reference, in this case the 2014 article of Rand et al. “Social heuristics 
shape intuitive cooperation”. The description of the SHH consists of a rather short post-hoc 
explanation about the spontaneous cooperation effect and its underlying moderators identified 
in 2012 (e.g., trust in cooperativeness of daily life interaction partners and experience with the 
laboratory setting of social dilemma experiments, see Chapter 2.3 of this thesis). Still, in the 
following, I attempt to formalize the original version of the theory (Rand et al., 2014) by 
defining its situational and dispositional antecedents that elicit, when fulfilled, the hypothesized 
behavioral consequences (see Table 2). In a second step, it is pointed out how the theory 
develops (i.e., how the antecedents and consequences change), while taking the evidence of the 
first paper and the hypotheses of the second paper into account. 
 
                                                 
17 To clarify, the empirical content of a theory is not empirically tested. However, given that the SHH is vague in 
its specification and mute in terms of its applicability beyond elementary cooperation behavior, the aim of both 
articles of this thesis is to consider reasonable specifications and further applicable areas and test these 
empirically. This allows one to revise the theory on an iterative basis with an increased empirical content. 
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Table 2. Increase in empirical content when modifying the SHH in accordance with identified and hypothesized moderators 
 
Article Increase in empirical content Antecedent Consequence 
Rand et al. (2014) Reference point:  
The original SHH as stated by 
Rand et al. (2014) 
If individuals decide in a one-shot, 
anonymous social dilemma whether 
to cooperate or not, 
then spontaneous decisions are more or 
similarly cooperative – though never more 
defective – in comparison to deliberate 
decisions.  
1st article (Mischkowski 
& Glöckner, 2016) 
Increased specificity by  
identifying SVO as a moderator 
for spontaneous cooperation 
If individuals decide in a one-shot, 
anonymous social dilemma whether 
to cooperate or not,  
then prosocials are more likely to cooperate 
spontaneously, whereas proselfs are expected 
to defect irrespective of decision time. 
2nd article 
(Mischkowski, 
Glöckner, et al., 2018), 
1st hypothesis 
Increased level of universality 
given spontaneous cooperation in 
first and second order public 
goods  
 
If any kind of cooperative choice 
(i.e., elementary cooperation or 
punishment as instrumental 
cooperation) is made in a one-shot, 
anonymous social dilemma,  
then spontaneous decisions are more or 
similarly cooperative – though never more 
defective – in comparison to deliberate 
decisions.  
 
2nd article,  
2nd hypothesis 
Increased level of universality as 
well as increased specificity given 
spontaneous cooperation and 
punishment being only valid for 
prosocials 
If any kind of cooperative choice 
(i.e., elementary or instrumental 
cooperation) is made in a one-shot, 
anonymous social dilemma,  
then prosocials are more likely to cooperate 
spontaneously, whereas proselfs are expected 
to defect irrespective of decision time. 




If individuals decide in a one-shot, 
anonymous social dilemma whether 
to punish or not, 
then punishment decreases with decision time 
for highly upset individuals, whereas 
individuals low in negative affect are expected 
to invest few resources to punish irrespective 
of decision time. 
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As Glöckner and Betsch (2011) point out, formalizing a scientific theory according to 
Karl Popper implies defining its antecedents and consequences. The antecedents refer to the 
areas of applications, reflecting the theory’s generality in terms of the situational and 
dispositional properties the theory makes predictions about. In turn, a theory’s specificity 
describes what it actually forbids, that is, which (e.g., behavioral) pattern would contradict and 
thus disprove the theory. According to Popper (1934/2005), scientific theories relate both 
components in a set of general implications that follow the form where all values of an object 
‘x’ (e.g., individuals) that satisfy the antecedent function φ(x) also fulfill the statement function 
of the consequences f(x). This means, simply put, that if a theory’s area of application is met, 
its prediction(s) must hold.  
Transferring these abstract considerations to the SHH illustrates how useful they are to 
evaluate theories: Reflecting on the SHH’s antecedents (i.e., its generality), it is inherently 
limited to observations of cooperation behavior in one-shot or the first round of anonymously 
conducted social dilemmas that generate a clear conflict between self- and collective interest. 
Even though further pro-sociality measures have been investigated in their dependence on 
processing mode (e.g., cheating behavior and social mindfulness, Köbis, Verschuere, Bereby-
Meyer, Rand, & Shalvi, 2019; Mischkowski, Thielmann, et al., 2018), the SHH in its original 
description solely refers to (elementary) cooperation behavior as measured in economic games 
entailing a social dilemma (Rand et al., 2014). Thus, the situations the theory applies to are 
rather limited, only allowing variation in the operationalization of cooperation behavior. Rand 
(2016) considers “the four canonical games” (p. 1194) as valid operationalizations of 
cooperation behavior, such as one-shot prisoner’s dilemmas, public good games, trust games, 
and the proposer’s behavior in ultimatum games (Rand, 2016).18 Selecting these games was a 
                                                 
18 The trust game consists of a dilemma situation between two players, where the first person (the trustor) sends 
any amount of her endowment to the second player, the trustee (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Kreps, 1990; 
for a review, see Thielmann & Hilbig, 2015). The amount is multiplied by a certain factor (larger than 1), so that 
the total amount increases. However, the trustee can decide how much, if any, she wants to send back to the 
trustor, putting the trustor in a vulnerable position. In turn, the ultimatum game consists of a dyad where one 
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matter of ensuring a clear conflict between collective and self-interest (not) to cooperate in one-
shot vs. repeated interactions (Rand, 2016).19 Specifically, Rand (2016) argues that it can be 
beneficial to cooperate in repeated interactions as reward or punishment mechanisms can 
rationalize cooperation behavior, whereas in one-shot interactions the payoff maximizing 
choice is always to defect. 
In this vein, clear operationalizations of a theory’s included concepts are an important 
part of good theorizing (Glöckner, 2019). A theory that includes unmeasurable concepts is 
impossible to test. In terms of the SHH, one must acknowledge the fact that it is clear which 
operationalizations of the main constructs (i.e., processing mode and cooperation behavior) are 
considered to be valid tests of the theory. This not only refers to cooperation behavior as 
outlined above, but also to the intuitive vs. deliberate processing mode (even though Rand 
changed the operationalization of the latter over time): As described in Chapter 2.1, an intuitive 
processing mode was originally also captured via decision time measurement in addition to 
induced time constraints (see Rand et al., 2012). In his meta-analysis in 2016, Rand explicitly 
states that cognitive load, ego depletion, and inducing an intuitive processing mode (e.g., via 
instructions to decide according to one’s gut feeling) are valid operationalizations allowing to 
test spontaneous cooperation in addition to time constraint manipulations. 
Taken together, the original formulation of the SHH provides a limited level of 
universality, as it only makes predictions about the spontaneity of cooperation, being mute on 
further pro-sociality measures. Turning towards the degree of precision or level of specificity, 
Rand et al. (2014) explicitly made the SHH account for both a positive relation between 
spontaneity/intuition and cooperation as well as null effects stating that “(…) on average, 
                                                 
player is in the role of the proposer, the other in the role of the recipient (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 
1982). The proposer receives an endowment that she can freely distribute between herself and the receiver. 
However, the receiver has the option to reject the offer, so that both players receive nothing. As rejecting unfair 
offers is seen as a form of altruistic punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003), Rand (2016) excludes the 
recipients’ behavior from the analysis of spontaneous cooperation. 
19 Rand (2016) explicitly excludes giving behavior in dictator games in his meta-analysis as it reflects pure 
altruism where the conflict between self- and other-interest does not vary between one-shot or repeated 
interactions (i.e., DG giving is considered neither payoff-maximizing in one-shot nor in repeated interactions). 
FROM SPONTANEOUS COOPERATION TO SPONTANEOUS PUNISHMENT  56 
intuition will favor cooperation” (p. 2). Strictly speaking, if a theory even allows null effects by 
claiming that these do not necessarily contradict the theory’s predictions, one is tempted to 
question its falsifiability, which is required in order to be considered scientific (Popper, 
1934/2005). The SHH is still falsifiable, as Rand et al. (2014) specify that “intuition should 
never decrease average cooperation relative to reflection in one-shot anonymous social 
dilemmas” (p. 2). However, it is obvious that a theory allowing both a positive relation between 
intuitive processing and cooperation as well as a null effect is less specific than a theory 
predicting either of these. Stated differently, “a theory is more precise than another one if it 
allows fewer different outcomes” (Glöckner & Betsch, 2011, p. 713). Indeed, Rand et al. (2014) 
take a first step to further specify the SHH in that they take their identified moderators (trust in 
the cooperativeness of daily life interaction partners, experience with the laboratory setting of 
social dilemmas; Rand et al., 2012) into consideration to predict “when intuition will, and will 
not, have an effect on cooperation” (p. 2). However, in contrast to these post-hoc integrated 
moderators, SVO explains on theoretical grounds why dispositional pro-sociality is a 
prerequisite of spontaneous cooperation (see introductory part of Chapter 3). When revising the 
SHH accordingly, the theory’s specificity increases (see Table 2). Importantly, the theory still 
considers prosocials and proselfs in the antecedents and makes predictions for both subgroups. 
This implies that its level of universality is not reduced. However, this revised version of the 
SHH specifies the behavioral predictions (i.e., consequences) that a negative relation between 
decision time and cooperation is expected for prosocials, whereas no relation would be 
predicted by the revised SHH for proselfs (see Table 2). Stated differently, this specifies the 
original SHH positing that null effects as well as a negative relation between decision time and 
cooperation could be expected, relating the different outcomes to the different subgroups.  
It goes without saying that the post-hoc identification of moderators cannot substitute a 
priori theorizing for whom an effect is (not) expected (Glöckner, 2019). Still, specifying a 
theory on an iterative basis is nevertheless important, as it enables researchers to derive future 
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testable predictions to critically challenge the new version of the theory and consequently 
allows for easier falsification thereof. As an example, consider the proselfs’ limited cooperation 
behavior irrespective of their decision time (i.e., the null effect of proselfs). It can be tested 
separately from the spontaneous cooperation effect for prosocials. In consequence, this enables 
one to better falsify the theory by specifically targeting one of those subgroups.  
Taken together, identifying SVO as a moderator allows for the further specification of 
the SHH, for whom spontaneous cooperation is (not) expected. Turning to the second paper, 
this targets the applicability of spontaneous cooperation to punishment behavior and thus 
focuses on the level of universality. To test the increase in empirical content due to the potential 
generalizability, it is investigated whether spontaneous decisions go in line with increased 
punishment behavior (see Table 2).20 Most notably, the second paper differentiates which 
factors shape a default to punish – that is, which motives underlie spontaneously expressed 
punishment. In line with the first paper, the first potential moderator under scrutiny was social 
value orientation. If it moderated spontaneous punishment, it would similarly indicate a default 
of prosocials not only to cooperate but also to punish norm violators. This finding would 
emphasize that dispositional pro-sociality is needed for both phenomena to appear. Importantly, 
this would allow one to not only generalize from spontaneous cooperation to spontaneous 
punishment – that is, spontaneous cooperation in first and second order public goods – but also 
provide a first indication towards a theory of spontaneous pro-sociality, as both acts are 
expressed by dispositional prosocials. This relation between punishment and further pro-
sociality measures is crucial to be able to consider (second-party) punishment as a prosocial act 
(Brethel-Haurwitz, Stoycos, Cardinale, Huebner, & Marsh, 2016; Henrich et al., 2006; see also 
Chapter 4.2.3). Similarly, and not mutually exclusive, a (potential) spontaneous punishment 
effect could also be motivated by revenge to regulate one’s negative affect that stems from 
                                                 
20 As outlined in Chapter 1.1, costly punishment in social dilemmas consists of a second-order public good (Fehr 
& Gächter, 2002) and is also called instrumental cooperation (Yamagishi, 1986) as it has the same structure as 
elementary cooperation of being individually costly but beneficial for the whole group. 
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being exploited by one’s group member(s): Fehr and Gächter (2002) showed that “[e]motions 
are an important proximate factor behind altruistic punishment“ (p. 139). However, if solely 
negative affect – and not SVO – motivated spontaneous punishment, this would render 
spontaneous punishment to a purely retributive act and distinguish it from spontaneous 
cooperation: The latter is inherently independent of any retributive affect directed towards 
group members, given that only one-shot or the first round of social dilemmas is considered. In 
consequence, if spontaneous punishment consisted of a retributive act only, without being 
additionally moderated by SVO, this would not allow one to generalize the SHH to a theory of 
spontaneous pro-sociality. 
Aims and hypotheses of the second article 
Taken together, the second paper aimed at investigating whether the spontaneous 
cooperation effect could be expanded to punishment behavior in that it followed the same 
behavioral pattern over the course of decision time. However, it was similarly important to 
scrutinize whether there are different motivations underlying spontaneous behavior in second 
vs. first order public goods. Therefore, three hypotheses in the second article are tested – the 
relation between decision time and punishment behavior in general in addition to two potential 
factors moderating the effect – that is, whether spontaneous punishment is conditional on a 
prosocial value orientation (second hypothesis) and / or negative affect (third hypothesis). 
Beyond testing these hypotheses, implementing a punishment stage holding all other 
factors of the previous studies’ design constant allows one to test whether spontaneous 
cooperation (for prosocials) replicates with the only modification of an anticipated punishment 
opportunity. That is, the second paper aimed for a critical test of whether the interaction effect 
of spontaneous cooperation for prosocials also holds when there is the anticipated threat of 
being punished. As proselfs are sensitive regarding context cues that might require cooperation 
(Declerck, Boone, & Emonds, 2013), one might argue that proselfs similarly have a cooperative 
default when they fear being punished. Further, the choice of a second-party punishment setting, 
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where each group member has the option to punish, allowed for the analysis of how punishment 
is related to one’s own contribution behavior. In terms of how to capture the individual default, 
measuring decision time for cooperation behavior allowed for a direct replication of the first 
paper. Even more importantly, choosing to measure decision time for punishment decisions 
enabled a direct comparison between spontaneous cooperation and punishment during an 
ongoing discussion about how the processing mode can(not) be captured. 
 To conclude, the second paper questions whether the results of the first paper generalize 
to punishment, and if so, whether the underlying motives are comparable. In addition, it allows 
one to analyze whether the spontaneous cooperation effect (for prosocials) is replicable when 
there is a threat of being punished.  
2ND ARTICLE: DIFFERENT MOTIVES UNDERLIE SPONTANEOUS BEHAVIOR  60 
  
 
4.1 2nd Article: Different motives underlie spontaneous behavior in first and second 





















Materials, analysis scripts, and data can be found at: https://osf.io/9rpwn/ 
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4.2 Discussion  
Similar to spontaneous cooperation, the invested resources to punish also decrease over 
the course of decision time, thereby providing evidence for a spontaneous punishment effect. 
In contrast to spontaneous cooperation, however, spontaneous punishment does not represent 
the default of prosocials and instead is only valid for highly upset, above-average contributors. 
Still, the spontaneous cooperation effect for prosocials replicates: Prosocials and proselfs differ 
in their spontaneously expressed cooperativeness, even when there is the threat of being 
punished. Discussing these results of this thesis’ second paper firstly deals with its limitations 
and tasks for future research. Specifically, the point in time of affect measurement as well as 
the already debated entanglement of intuition and decision conflict when measuring decision 
time are taken into account. Finally, the question is discussed whether (second-party) 
punishment can be interpreted as a prosocial act at all that would allow proposing a more 
general theory of spontaneous pro-sociality. In this vein, related pro-sociality measures are 
discussed concerning their relation with decision time and their dependence on the processing 
mode to shed further light on the SHH’s level of universality.  
4.2.1 Affect measurement 
Measuring affect via rating scales after individuals have made their decision is a 
common procedure (e.g., Bosman & Van Winden, 2002; Cubitt, Drouvelis, & Gächter, 2011). 
However, a non-obtrusive acquisition of affect in the moment of the punishment decision (or 
starting even earlier at the evaluation phase of the other players’ contributions) would be 
preferable in future research. Particularly the inclusion of eye-tracking (Partala & Surakka, 
2003) or measurement of skin conductance could provide more objective, on-time information 
about individuals’ physiological arousal (see also S. Fiedler, Glöckner, & Nicklisch, 2012), still 
avoiding affective asynchrony and affective labeling – the two main reasons why affect was 
2ND ARTICLE: DISCUSSION   76 
assessed after the punishment decision.21 This would specifically allow for investigating 
whether the interaction of spontaneous punishment for highly upset individuals in the first study 
would appear when affect is measured right at the time of decision making. To briefly reiterate, 
in the first study of Mischkowski, Glöckner, et al. (2018) the public goods game consisted of 
two rounds and affect was measured comprehensively afterwards. The negative affect of the 
first round relevant for the analyses was thus confounded as participants reported their negative 
affect across both interactions. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that additional emotional 
factors (e.g., the fear of counter-punishment in the subsequent round, see Denant-Boemont, 
Masclet, & Noussair, 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008; Nikiforakis & Engelmann, 2011) divert the 
outrage in the first round resulting from defective behavior of other group members. The second 
study, containing only a one-shot public goods game, could rule out both limitations. Still, 
future research might benefit from non-obtrusive affect measures. 
4.2.2 Differentiating (again) between decision conflict and intuitive processing 
The correlative design of the studies reported in Mischkowski, Glöckner, et al. (2018) 
allows once more to analyze the replicability, respectively robustness of the decision conflict 
hypothesis, attributing short decision times to low decision conflict rather than intuitive 
processing. Specifically, it regards decision time as an indicator of an individual’s strength of 
preference (that is equivalent to low decision conflict) and predicts that not only highly 
cooperative but also defective choices in the public goods game are made faster than 
intermediately cooperative decisions (A. M. Evans et al., 2015). In addition to the analysis of 
elementary cooperation behavior, the second paper also allows for the exploratory analysis of 
a potentially inverse u-shaped pattern for punishment investments when predicting decision 
times. Sticking to the procedure of the additional analyses of the first paper, I will again follow 
the approach of A. M. Evans et al. (2015), analyzing the relation of decision time and 
                                                 
21 Affective asynchrony refers to reduced affect with increasing reflection about it (Peters & Slovic, 2007); 
affective labeling represents the phenomenon to reduce the affective state by expressing it (Lieberman et al., 
2007). 
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cooperation extremes in addition to explicitly testing for a non-linear (i.e., inverse u-shaped) 
relation between cooperation behavior and decision time by adding a squared term of 
contributions in the regression model. In a second step, the same analyses are conducted for 
punishment investments, investigating whether they similarly follow an inverse u-shaped 
pattern in their relation to decision time. 
Differentiation for cooperation behavior 
To begin with the analysis of cooperation behavior, descriptive statistics are 
comprehensively provided in Table 3. Similar as in the additional analyses of this thesis’ first 
paper, the results by A. M. Evans et al. (2015) were again replicated in that decision extremes 
(i.e., highly cooperative and defective choices) are faster in comparison to intermediate 
contributions (i.e., a negative relation between decision times and deviation in contributions 
from the scale mean; β = -.28, p < .001). Note that again, the negative relation between decision 
time and contributions remains significant (i.e., the spontaneous cooperation effect; β = -.26, p 
< .001).22 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the relevant variables of the additional analyses 
 
 Mean (SD) Min Max 
Contributions (in %) 65.18 (38.57) 0 100 
Decision extremes 34.74 (16.64) 2.32 65.18 
Decision Time (in sec.) 17.39 (12.44) 5.51 113.89 
Decision Time (log 10 sec.)  1.17 (0.24) 0.74 2.06 
Note. Decision extremes consist of the absolute difference of contributions to the scale mean. 
 
                                                 
22 Note that a study dummy was again included in this and all subsequent analyses to control for study 
differences. In line with A. M. Evans et al. (2015) decision extremes and contributions were mean-centered. 
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Secondly, there is once more a significant quadratic term for contributions when 
regressing response time on mean centered contributions and their squared term (β = -.35, p < 
.001) across both studies. The linear effect remains significant (β = -.35, p < .001), showing that 
even when controlling for the curvilinear trend, the linear relation still holds. As the first 
necessary condition for an inverse u-shaped pattern is fulfilled by the negative and significant 
squared term, I followed the approach of Lind and Mehlum (2010) and additionally examined 
whether the extremum point is in the value range of contributions. Indeed, the extremum is 
located at 48.49% of contributions, accompanied by a significant positive slope to its left-hand 
side (b = .006, p < .001) and a negative significant slope to its right-hand side of comparable 
magnitude (b = -.007, p < .001), unequivocally supporting the inverted u-shaped pattern (see 
Figure 6).23 
 
Figure 6. Prediction of decision time as a function of contributions and their squared term. 
Grey-dashed lines denote the 95% confidence interval. 
                                                 
23 For illustrative purposes, the graph contains non-centered contributions, the reported extremum correcting for 
the linear shift of mean-centered contributions and their squared term used in the regression model. 
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Summarizing the results of the additional analyses on the spontaneity of cooperation 
behavior of both articles (Mischkowski & Glöckner, 2016; Mischkowski, Glöckner, et al., 
2018), there is consistent evidence that decision extremes of cooperation behavior are made 
faster than intermediately cooperative choices, be it tested as the absolute deviance from the 
scale mean or by including a quadratic term of contributions. This supports the assumption that 
the strength of preference or a lack of decision conflict influence decision time, resulting in the 
spontaneity of both decision extremes – be it cooperation or defection. Thus, our results support 
the claim that reversely inferring an intuitive processing mode from short decision times 
neglects additional concepts related to decision time (A. M. Evans et al., 2015; A. M. Evans & 
Rand, 2018; Krajbich et al., 2015).  
What is not targeted by A. M. Evans et al. (2015) shows the incremental value of both 
papers of this thesis (Mischkowski & Glöckner, 2016; Mischkowski, Glöckner, et al., 2018): 
Taking person-situation interactions into account allows one to consider the origin of an 
individual’s strength of preference and – in turn – predict her spontaneously expressed response. 
In other words, considering SVO as the moderator of spontaneous cooperation points out that 
decision times for cooperation are rooted in social preferences and correspond to different 
spontaneously expressed extremes: The inverse u-shaped pattern of cooperation behavior and 
decision time reflects the default of both groups of social preferences, prosocials and proselfs 
– an advantage of curvilinear testing that is suppressed when only considering the average linear 
relation between cooperation and decision time that varies in its direction dependent on the 
proportion of prosocials and proselfs (for similar results, see also Yamagishi et al., 2017). 
Future research should investigate whether self-paced short decision time – implying 
low decision conflict – might not also entail intuitive processing. Upon closer examination, 
decision conflict as a cause for deliberation is also incorporated by dual process models (e.g., 
Pennycook et al., 2015). Thus, it might very well be that prosocials decide intuitively to 
cooperate (Chen & Fischbacher, 2019), as they have a clear preference to do so and thus their 
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decision conflict is a priori low. Yamagishi et al. (2017) investigated the decision conflict of 
prosocials in more detail – specifically, why prosocials prolong their decision time and 
simultaneously reduce their cooperation. The authors showed that prosocials’ decision times 
increase with a fear of being exploited. This decision conflict might similarly go in line with an 
increased (necessity for) deliberation about whether to comply with one’s default (i.e., 
cooperate) or override it (i.e., defect). 
 Referring again to the SHH, excluding measured decision time (see Rand, 2016) might 
be a practical approach but is certainly insufficient on theoretical grounds. It suggests that 
intuitive processing is inherently independent of decision conflict and requires the specification 
of one’s understanding of intuition in the first place. It is a demanding task on its own to grasp 
a common and still specific definition of intuition (see Glöckner & Witteman, 2010). Yet it 
again serves the purpose of good theorizing not only to provide labels of constructs and 
corresponding operationalizations but also to provide a deeper comprehension of the construct 
that in turn allows one to evaluate the suitability of certain operationalizations. Thus, one has 
to go beyond the descriptive labels of intuitive processing (e.g., fast, effortless, affective; see 
Chapter 1.2) to define what intuition is and is not. This would greatly facilitate the 
understanding regarding the variability of findings concerning the cognitive underpinnings of 
cooperation behavior and find theory-wise common ground, even though this yields the risk of 
being obliged to modify or even reject the SHH. 
Differentiation for punishment behavior 
Testing for the inverse u-shaped pattern of decision time for punishment investments 
sheds additional light on the comparability of cooperation behavior and punishment in their 
relation to decision time. Thus, I will test in the following whether the same pattern of decision 
time also holds for punishment investments – that is, whether similarly low as well as high 
punishment investments are made faster than an intermediate level of punishment. When 
transferring the analyses from cooperation to punishment, one has to keep in mind that the 
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situation is a priori different in comparison to analyzing the extremities of cooperation behavior. 
This is because the available resources to punish differ for each player, as these are conditional 
on the first stage of the game (i.e., the contribution behavior of the individual and one’s group 
members determine the earnings before a potential punishment). Thus, punishment investments 
of the same size differ in terms of their relative severity, depending on the outcome of the first 
stage. Stated differently, decision extremities for punishment are difficult to define without 
having earnings of the first stage of the public goods game as a reference point. This is why 
punishment investments are rescaled as the percentage of the individual outcome in the first 
stage of the game. But even when doing so, the distribution of punishment investments is highly 
skewed to the right (see Figure 7): Almost two thirds of the overall sample chose not to punish 
at all (n = 177; 63,90%), which is also reflected in a very low, average investment of 4.28% 
(SD = 9.39) of the earnings of the first stage to punish (Min = 0%, Max = 50.00%). Decision 
time for punishment varies between 3.04 and 34.40 seconds (M = 8.22, SD = 3.83), being again 
logarithmized (M = 0.88, SD = 0.17) to approximate a normal distribution (Mayerl, 2009).  
The highly skewed distribution of punishment decisions causes a multicollinearity 
problem between punishment investments and punishment extremes (i.e., the absolute 
difference between punishment investments relative to one’s earnings and the scale mean), even 
when mean-centering both variables (r = .93, p < .001). In consequence, the accuracy of the 
corresponding regression model predicting logarithmized decision time is highly reduced as 
both predictors are nearly redundant. Thus, neither relative punishment investments (β = -.14, 
p = .386) nor punishment extremes (β = -.09, p = .553) are predictive of decision time in this 
model.  
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Figure 7. Prediction of decision time as a function of punishment investments, percentual to 
the earnings after the first stage of the public goods game, and their squared term. Grey-dashed 
lines denote the 95% confidence interval. 
 
As the graphical inspection already reflects the absence of an inverse u-shaped pattern, 
the further analysis (Lind & Mehlum, 2007, 2010) consequently supports this null result when 
including a quadratic term in the prediction of decision time by mean-centered punishment 
investments (β = .05, p = .715, see Figure 7).24 Given that the necessary condition of a 
significant squared term is not fulfilled, it is obsolete to test for the sufficient conditions (i.e., 
testing whether the extremum is within the data range and a corresponding significant decrease 
of the curve to both sides of the extremum). 
Summarizing these results, the lack of a u-shaped pattern for punishment investments 
further underlines the distinctiveness of cooperation and punishment behavior despite their 
conceptual similarities as contributions to first and second order public goods (see Chapter 1.1). 
                                                 
24 For illustrative purposes, the graph contains non-centered punishment investments. 
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The following chapter discusses more extensively whether (second-party) punishment 
represents an act of pro-sociality at all which is crucial to evaluate whether spontaneous 
punishment (does not) allow for generalizing spontaneous cooperation towards a theory of 
spontaneous pro-sociality. 
4.2.3 Punishment as a prosocial act? 
The second article shows that spontaneous cooperation differs in comparison to 
spontaneous punishment in terms of the underlying motives, even though both cooperation and 
punishment show a similar pattern over the course of decision time. When only considering the 
similar relations of cooperation and punishment behavior with decision time, one might argue 
for summarizing the results under a broader framework of spontaneous pro-sociality. However, 
when focusing on the underlying motives, our findings suggest that affective rather than 
prosocial motives influence spontaneous punishment: People invest resources to achieve their 
goal of retaliation (Camerer & Fehr, 2004). Thus, it is questionable whether the underlying pro-
sociality is sufficiently captured in a second-party punishment setting where individuals need 
to decide whether to cooperate themselves. Typically, third-party punishment is considered 
altruistic and thus as a form of pro-sociality (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). Future research could 
investigate whether SVO gains importance as a moderator for spontaneous – altruistic – 
punishment, when the punisher is not a contributing group member, but is responsible to watch 
over the welfare of the whole group. 
However, independent of whether a second- or third-party punishment setting is applied, 
the general question has been raised whether so-called altruistic punishment is actually related 
to additional altruistic measures, challenging the pro-sociality of punishment in general. Here, 
contradictory evidence has been found (e.g., Brethel-Haurwitz et al., 2016; Henrich et al., 
2006). Evidence linking punishment behavior to dispositional pro-sociality is similarly 
heterogeneous; for instance, there is no relation with honesty-humility (Zettler, Hilbig, & 
Heydasch, 2013). As outlined in Chapter 1.1, results for a relation with SVO have been 
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identified in both directions (e.g., Bieleke et al., 2016; Karagonlar & Kuhlman, 2013); the 
results of Mischkowski, Glöckner, et al. (2018) overall provide no evidence for a relation 
between SVO and punishment (for similar findings, see also Böckler et al., 2016; Peysakhovich, 
Nowak, & Rand, 2014; Yamagishi et al., 2012). 
Taken together, evidence on the pro-sociality of punishment is too heterogeneous to 
globally infer its degree of pro-sociality. To further elaborate on the generality of the SHH as a 
theory of spontaneous pro-sociality, I will summarize evidence for related pro-sociality 
measures and their dependence on the processing mode, respectively decision time, in the 
following. 
4.2.4 Evidence for related pro-sociality measures 
In sum, three additional pro-sociality measures were investigated in their dependence to 
the processing mode, respectively their relation with decision time. The closest to cooperation 
behavior being altruism as measured by dictator game giving, next to social mindfulness as a 
form of low-cost cooperation behavior (Lemmers-Jansen et al., 2018; Van Doesum, Van Lange, 
& Van Lange, 2013). Finally, there was a recent attempt to apply the SHH to (un-)ethical 
behavior in that the intuitiveness of cheating was meta-analytically investigated (Köbis et al., 
2019). 
Starting with altruistic preferences as measured by dictator game giving, these did not 
provide clear evidence in their relation with decision time in that both spontaneous egocentrism 
was found (e.g., S. Fiedler et al., 2013; Piovesan & Wengström, 2009) as well as spontaneous 
fairness as indicated by shorter decision time for fair in comparison to selfish allocations (e.g., 
Cappelen, Nielsen, Tungodden, Tyran, & Wengström, 2016). A similarly heterogeneous pattern 
holds when the processing mode was manipulated (e.g., via time pressure or cognitive load): 
Achtziger, Alós-Ferrer, and Wagner (2015) showed less giving under cognitive load in 
comparison to a no load condition. Schulz, Fischbacher, Thöni, and Utikal (2014) in turn 
showed an intuitive striving for fair in comparison to payoff maximizing allocations. Several 
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null effects were similarly found (e.g., Hauge, Brekke, Johansson, Johansson-Stenman, & 
Svedsäter, 2016; Tinghög et al., 2016). As dictator game giving is closely related to cooperation 
behavior (see Chapter 1.1), these results were linked to the SHH (e.g., Cappelen et al., 2016), 
adding to the opaque pattern as outlined in Chapter 2.2. As outlined, Rand (2016) however 
explicitly excludes dictator games from testing the SHH as these consist only of unilateral 
giving, which is individually always non-beneficial, be it in one-shot or in iterative interactions.  
As a measure of low-cost cooperation, social mindfulness contrasts whether the freedom 
of choice of another person is left or limited in interdependent relationships (i.e., by leaving or 
limiting the choice options between two different kinds of objects for a subsequent chooser; 
Van Lange & Van Doesum, 2015). Specifically, it involves both the skill and the will to act in 
a socially mindful manner that ensures another individual’s control over outcomes (Van 
Doesum et al., 2013). Based on its comparability to cooperation behavior (Lemmers-Jansen et 
al., 2018), social mindfulness was strongly suggested to vary dependent on the processing mode 
(Van Lange & Van Doesum, 2015). However, Mischkowski, Thielmann, et al. (2018) 
consistently found no effect when testing across several studies and processing mode 
manipulations.  
Finally, a recent meta-analysis on the intuitiveness of cheating behavior was conducted 
to provide a highly powered test of the question whether there is intuitive (dis-)honesty (Köbis 
et al., 2019). Similar to the debate on spontaneous cooperation behavior, contradictory findings 
elicited the debate. To exemplify, it was shown, on the one hand, that ‘honesty requires time’ 
(Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012), whereas, on the other hand, Van't Veer, Stel, and van 
Beest (2014) showed an intuitively honest attitude of participants. Köbis et al. (2019) meta-
analytically confirmed that dishonesty (i.e., cheating behavior) is the intuitive response that is 
overruled with increasing deliberation, thus fundamentally contradicting a more general 
approach of spontaneous ethicality. However, the effect reverses when considering a specific 
moderator, namely whether cheating behavior targets a directly harmed person (e.g., a group 
2ND ARTICLE: DISCUSSION   86 
member in a two-person cheating paradigm) in contrast to an anonymous experimenter. Köbis 
et al. (2019) attribute the results in line with the SHH: “In accordance with previous theorizing, 
particularly the social heuristics hypothesis (Bear & Rand, 2016; Rand, 2016), our data are in 
line with the idea that salient consequences for others have a substantial impact on people’s 
intuitive decisions.” (p. 15).  
This broad interpretation of the SHH’s application areas – when referring to salient 
consequences for others as the only perimeter – deserves further investigation, as it has 
fundamental implications on the SHH’s level of universality and would require a reformulation 
of the SHH’s application areas beyond cooperation behavior. Stated differently, these findings 
are only useful if they are taken to predict future behavior. As is, the SHH is only taken as a 
post-hoc explanation, mentioning that findings are ‘in line with’ the theory, but not as a critical 
test against it (see Platt, 1964). 
Taken together, the empirical pattern of conceptual replications or – more broadly – 
investigation with related pro-sociality measures does not suggest generalizing the SHH to a 
more universal theory of spontaneous pro-sociality. However, when being limited in its 
application areas (i.e., its antecedents, in this case cooperation behavior), one cannot claim an 
intuitiveness of pro-sociality in general. Therefore, summarizing the results of Rand and others 
under the framework of ‘intuitive pro-sociality’ (Zaki & Mitchell, 2013) was premature. In the 
following, I will draw a general summary and discuss how future research could most 
effectively contribute to further develop the SHH.
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5. General discussion and outlook 
The spontaneous cooperation effect has received enormous attention and 
correspondingly encouraged a large number of follow-up studies showing how context- and 
personality dependent the effect is (see Chapter 2.2 and 2.3). As a result of several failed 
replications, the effect has lost its original impact and spirit. Originally, the effect emphasized 
cooperation as the initial, ‘spontaneous’ response in social dilemma contexts, underlining the 
notion that humans are prosocial in the first place and that only increased cognitive effort leads 
to ‘calculated greed’ – that is, the unintended side effect of promoting selfishness (Rand et al., 
2012). More than six years after the original publication, the remaining key message is rather 
defensive, insisting that when repeated interactions are internalized or expected, spontaneous 
cooperation also evolves in one-shot social dilemmas (Everett et al., 2017; Isler et al., 2018). 
Due to this confirmatory evidence, the SHH has not yet been rejected. The reluctance to falsify 
a theory is a well-known phenomenon (e.g., Wason, 1960), but one might emphasize in terms 
of the advance of knowledge that “[there are] benefits of being wrong” (Glöckner & Betsch, 
2011, p. 711). These benefits – in the Popperian sense of approaching truth by falsification – 
have so far been neglected with regard to the SHH.  
This thesis offers two main contributions to the discussion regarding spontaneous 
cooperation, both of which are based on theoretical grounds. First, it specifies for whom – that 
is, which individuals – the prediction of spontaneous cooperation holds and thereby 
consolidates heterogeneous replication results of the effect: Depending on the average 
dispositional pro-sociality in a sample, spontaneous cooperation may or may not occur. Second, 
the thesis tested whether the effect generalizes to second order public goods – that is, 
punishment decisions – which would increase the theory’s level of universality and thus its 
empirical content. However, the generalizability is limited: When investigating spontaneous 
behavior in second order public goods, a similar main effect of spontaneous punishment 
indicates at first glance that punishment and cooperation are comparable in their course over 
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decision time. When considering the underlying motives, however, clear differences turn 
visible: The influencing role of negative affect and the only indirect influence of SVO (i.e., via 
contributions) on spontaneous punishment limit the inference to a more general hypothesis of 
spontaneous pro-sociality. In this vein, the comparability of elementary and instrumental 
cooperation in terms of their level of pro-sociality has recently been called into question (see 
Brethel-Haurwitz et al., 2016).  
From a methodological point of view, the two papers of this thesis comply with the 
standards of reproducibility and open science by providing several replication studies and 
making all data and materials available. The design of the second paper, in particular, allowed 
for testing whether both the main effect of spontaneous cooperation and the interaction with 
SVO replicate when the threat of being punished is anticipated. Admittedly, the results are 
limited to self-paced (i.e., measured) decision time (see sections 3.2.1 and 4.2.2). The additional 
analyses provided here show that there is an inverse u-shaped pattern indicating low decision 
time for decision extremes in elementary cooperation (A. M. Evans et al., 2015). This pattern 
is attributed to single process models (e.g., Klauer, 2014), showing the importance of decision 
conflict as a predictor of decision time. Thus, the results provided here corroborate previous 
findings that short decision times cannot only be ascribed to intuitive processing. However, 
some dual process models also incorporate (low) decision conflict as a prerequisite for intuitive 
decision making (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook et al., 2015). Future research is 
needed to disentangle when long decision times correspond to deliberation and when to a 
lacking strength of preference (Konovalov & Krajbich, 2019). 
To have a more constructive scientific debate about the spontaneous cooperation effect 
that goes beyond discussing how to best operationalize processing mode and which individuals 
(not) to exclude (see Bouwmeester et al., 2017; Rand, 2017a, 2018), the corresponding theory 
needs to be challenged by competing theoretical explanations. In other words, the challenge the 
SHH must accomplish is to go one step further from post-hoc explanation of identified effects 
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towards predicting behavior a priori. Similar to the aim of the second paper of this thesis, it is 
an important step to explore the level of universality of a theory, but the next step is clearly in 
order: Results must be used to propose a modified version of the SHH that can then be critically 
tested (e.g., testing when deliberation promotes pro-sociality) rather than attributing mixed 
results only to methodological reasons.
5.1 Future directions for research on spontaneous cooperation 
The immunity to critical testing, at least to a certain degree, is a common phenomenon 
among theories in judgment and decision making (Glöckner & Betsch, 2011). However, it 
should not be accepted without question. The current lack of empirical content (Popper, 
1934/2005) impedes the development of an experimental design that aims at disproving the 
SHH, intending to show its boundaries of validity where cooperation is the deliberate yet non-
beneficial choice. In contrast to purely effect-based research, revising and developing the theory 
is certainly the more difficult endeavor. 
However, there is a starting point for future research, as results do exist that show the 
opposite pattern of increased cooperation under deliberation (even though this evidence has not 
yet been used to revise the theory). For instance, Yamagishi et al. (2017) show a behavioral 
pattern of increased cooperation behavior under deliberation for proselfs. Does this falsify the 
SHH? In line with the current methodological dispute, one could either argue that measuring 
decision time as Yamagishi et al. (2017) did cannot unequivocally operationalize processing 
mode and thus may not be used to test the SHH. An approach that focuses on the accumulation 
of evidence might refer to the different pattern presented in both articles of this thesis, where 
cooperation remains stable across decision time for proselfs. In general, one cannot consider a 
theory as falsified based on one or two occasional findings (Glöckner & Betsch, 2011). Thus, 
it is legitimate to ask for clarification in a meta-analysis, as has been actually called for (JDM-
mailing list call of Andrighetto, Bruner, Steinmo, Szekely, & Capraro, 07.02.2018). However, 
as the SHH forbids increased reflective cooperation, the finding of Yamagishi et al. (2017) 
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should be taken as a starting point to explore the SHH’s boundaries, when deliberation rather 
than intuition favors cooperation. Metaphorically speaking: Adding further evidence showing 
spontaneous cooperation is similar to presenting a white swan to support the hypothesis that all 
swans are white (see J. S. B. Evans, 1982). To gain knowledge, the search for a black swan 
(that is, replicable evidence that shows the boundaries of spontaneous cooperation) is needed. 
Strictly speaking, future research has few worthwhile alternatives to this path. 
5.2 Conclusion 
The replication history of the spontaneous cooperation effect and the underlying SHH 
contained at first glance all important aspects that heterogeneous findings ask for: Several 
replication analyses, a meta-analysis, or a registered replication report – most of said endeavors 
being conducted under the principles of open science, providing preregistrations, open 
materials, and data. What is lacking is a focus on the SHH as the underlying theory and what it 
forbids rather than attempting (and partially failing) to add confirmatory evidence. The articles 
of this thesis contribute to specify the SHH, for whom spontaneous cooperation holds, in 
addition to a test of its (limited) generalizability. Developing alternative theoretical explications 
that also account for increased cooperation with decision time (see Yamagishi et al., 2017) 
depending on individuals’ social preferences is the next important step this research line must 
take, as it counteracts the only specification of the original SHH, stating that cooperation should 
never increase with deliberation (Rand et al., 2014).  
From a meta-scientific perspective, existing research on spontaneous cooperation has 
received outstanding attention (e.g., one meta-analysis and one registered replication report in 
Psychological Science in less than a year). Therefore, contributing researchers have – and 
should make use of – the rare chance to lead by example in terms of how to proceed when an 
effect is under dispute. It is important to move the field from a methodological, effect-based 
debate towards a theory-driven discussion. The spontaneous cooperation effect and its 
underlying theory provide the opportunity to do so. Taking advantage of this opportunity 
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consists of a cooperative act to the public good of accumulating knowledge itself – be it 
spontaneous or deliberate.
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